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Foreword
We are pleased to launch the newly designed Newport Papers series with an intriguing
case study, The Third Battle, by Owen Cote. In a manuscript developed under the edito-
rial leadership of Dr. Thomas B. Grassey, then Press editor, Dr. Cote argues that the U.S.
Navy’s innovative response to the Soviet submarine fleet during the Cold War represents
the third great battle for control of the seas in the 20th century. Technology was always
the key factor in the continuing seesaw peacetime race between the two superpowers.
Dr. Cote, Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, provides a critical groundbreaking perspective on this battle—quite
different from the two that preceded it. During the two world wars, the then new and
revolutionary submarine threatened the ability of the major naval powers to gain deci-
sive control of the sea. In peacetime, the Allied powers were unable, or perhaps ulti-
mately basically reluctant, to prepare innovative and effective measures to counter
submarine use. In war, they then faced unrestricted submarine warfare and the attend-
ing significant losses. Those antisubmarine measures that were eventually developed
were short-lived because of the close technological arms race between the combatants.
It was only with the development in the mid-1980s of truly quiet Soviet nuclear sub-
marines that the U.S. Navy decisively confronted the antisubmarine warfare challenge.
Cote details the events leading to that point and presents a critical study of technologi-
cal innovation with clear implications for challenges in the 21st century.
This latest Newport Paper, the sixteenth in the generic series established in 1991, re-
flects the talents of the many who worked toward its production. David Chapman of
Chapman and Partners, Warren, Rhode Island, is responsible for the overall design; the
creative searching of Elizabeth Davis led to the discovery of the Newport map that will
be the series’ signature cover. Patricia Goodrich edited the manuscript with grace and
style, under the thoughtful eye of Pelham Boyer, Managing Editor.
In the next several months, two additional Newport papers will be published. We wel-
come comments, suggestions, and proposals for this relaunched series
C A T H E R I N E M C A R D L E K E L L E H E R
Editor, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
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Introduction
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, submarines have been the weapon of
choice for weaker naval powers that wish to contest a dominant power’s control of the
seas or its ability to project power ashore from the sea. This is because submarines have
been and are likely to remain the weapon system with the highest leverage in a battle
for control of the ocean surface. Hence, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) will always re-
main the most important element of the U.S. Navy’s core mission—sea control.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, submarines have also become a weapon of
the strong, both because they became a major if not the dominant platform for per-
forming ASW, and because they also became a dominant means of projecting power
from the sea, first as a nuclear delivery platform, and now, at the end of the century, as
a conventional precision strike platform.
For the U.S. Navy, maintaining superiority in ASW and maximizing its ability to pro-
ject power from the sea will require innovative contributions by each of its platform
communities in new mission areas, as it did during the Cold War. It is likely that the
sources of victory in these future endeavors will be similar to those that gave the Navy a
great victory in the Third Battle.
This paper seeks to establish the record of naval innovation in ASW during the Cold
War so that an analysis of the sources of that innovation can proceed. It looks specifi-
cally at how ASW was conducted over time and at how the roles of the Navy’s different
platform communities changed over time. At the heart of this story is the transforma-
tion of the U.S. submarine force into the main ASW weapon in the struggle against
Soviet submarines. The lessons of this transformation should be relevant to the task of
meeting future ASW challenges, and they can serve as a guide to the submarine force and
the Navy’s other platform communities as they face demands to adopt new missions.
In two world wars, control of the sea by the major naval powers was threatened by the
submarine. This resulted both from the inherent capabilities of a revolutionary new
weapon of war, the submarine, and the inability or the reluctance of the major naval
powers to anticipate this threat and prepare innovative and effective antisubmarine
measures during peacetime to counter it. When first faced with unrestricted submarine
warfare, Britain in World War I, and Britain, the United States, and Japan in World War
II all suffered grievous losses, especially to their merchant marines, which were to vary-
ing degrees their economic lifelines as well as their means of deploying military forces
to distant shores. In two successive battles of the Atlantic against German submarines,
the Allies eventually reestablished sea control after enormous effort, while in the Pacific
during World War II, the Japanese never effectively countered American submarines,
lost control of vital sea lines of communication, and were economically and strategi-
cally strangled as a result. Furthermore, the victory of antisubmarine over submarine
forces in the Second Battle of the Atlantic proved short-lived, as the end of World War
II saw the deployment of new German U-boats which largely returned to the subma-
rine its recently lost advantages over antisubmarine forces. As the Cold War began, the
Soviet Navy adopted these new submarine technologies and the U.S. Navy faced the
task of developing an effective response to a new submarine challenge in peacetime.
The U.S. Navy’s global Cold War ASW effort therefore constituted the third great battle
for control of the seas against the submarine, albeit one that remained a peacetime
effort. Prior experience predicted that this battle would not go well for the United
States. For example, Great Britain’s record of peacetime preparation and innovation in
ASW before the two World Wars had not been a good one. Moreover, other new tech-
nologies spawned by the World War II mobilization, such as missiles and nuclear en-
ergy, promised both to tilt the balance between the submarine and ASW forces further
in favor of the former and to increase the vulnerabilities that would result from ASW
failure. For example, nuclear-powered submarines would be much more difficult to
counter by ASW forces, and ballistic and cruise missiles would give submarines potent
new offensive capabilities, allowing them to expand beyond commerce raiding into
new mission areas.
This paper shows that the U.S. Navy’s response over time to the threat posed by the
Soviet submarine fleet during the Cold War was extremely innovative. The Navy kept
its ASW posture responsive during the Third Battle to a series of peacetime challenges
by the Soviet submarine force, including their first deployments of diesel submarines
based on the German Type XXI, the first ballistic and cruise missile submarines, and
then several generations of nuclear-powered submarines of all types. This edge re-
mained largely intact through the mid-1980s, when the first truly quiet Soviet nuclear
submarines were finally deployed, giving the end of the Third Battle the same “saved by
the bell” character as the end of the Second Battle of the Atlantic. In its aftermath, the
Navy once again found itself facing serious new ASW challenges, and the submarine
force found itself looking for new missions.
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In sketching an outline of the course of the Third Battle, this paper focuses on the tech-
nical and doctrinal innovations whose exploitation allowed the Navy to deal with suc-
cessive generations of the Soviet undersea threat. It is part of a larger project that seeks
the best explanation for why and how the Navy was able to maintain this record of in-
novation in a specific warfare area over so long a period in peacetime.1 Better knowl-
edge of the sources of innovation in peacetime is important in today’s security
environment. In some respects, this security environment resembles that which the
Navy as well as the other services faced after World War II and before Korea, and it was
in this period that the seeds of victory in the Third Battle were sown. A formidable foe
had been defeated and a new peer competitor against which to plan had yet to clearly
emerge. There are both interservice and intraservice debates about which missions to
emphasize and about which platforms can best perform them. The pace of develop-
ment in certain commercial technologies relevant to the military is accelerating with
largely unpredictable consequences. And though the war on terrorism has led to in-
creases in the defense budget, the long-term prospects for high levels of defense spend-
ing remain uncertain. Under these circumstances, many elements of the U.S. military’s
Cold War structure appear threatened with obsolescence and are struggling to adapt to
the demands of the new security environment, and in many cases, success in this strug-
gle will demand fairly radical innovation.
This paper is organized into six sections corresponding to distinct phases in the century-
long battle between the submarine and its opponents. The first section provides a his-
torical overview from the initial development of the modern submarine in 1900
through to the end of World War II. This is followed by a section on each of four
phases of the Third Battle: meeting the challenge posed by Soviet adaptation of Ger-
man Type XXI diesel submarines immediately after World War II; meeting the chal-
lenge posed by nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons; meeting the challenge of
preserving an ASW barrier strategy based on a passive acoustic advantage; and meeting
the challenge of passive acoustic parity. For each stage in this forty-year Cold War
struggle, the paper describes the new demands placed by the Soviet submarine fleet on
the U.S. Navy’s ASW posture and the steps taken or not taken to meet those demands.
Finally, the paper closes with a discussion of the current situation in ASW, with a focus
on the dual challenge posed by the end of the Cold War and the wide availability of
modern, non-nuclear submarines. Inevitably, this structure will give the reader a sense
of cause and effect, with a Soviet challenge seeming to directly cause an American re-
sponse; but the intent of the paper is only to describe what happened when, not to ex-
plain the sources of the behavior being discussed. Only when the record of the Third
Battle is established with some clarity can the task of explaining it begin.
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The rationale used for distinguishing successive phases of the submarine threat com-
bines two elements. One is the evolution of submarine design, and the other is the evo-
lution of its weapons and missions. The first element is what largely determines the
operational and technical demands on antisubmarine forces, while the second largely
determines the importance of ASW as a mission. Together with the maritime geogra-
phy in which conflict occurs or is contemplated, they determine the ebb and flow of
the balance between the submarine and its foes, and particularly those points in time
when it is both most important and most difficult for a maritime power to gain and
maintain control of the undersea battle space.
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From Holland to the Second Battle
The First Fifty Years
The first modern submarine was the Holland, which the U.S. Navy adopted in 1900,
and the design for which was sold to other naval powers of the day. It was the harbin-
ger of one of the two great naval innovations of the first half of the twentieth century,
the other being the aircraft. In reference to this revolution, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1941:
The torpedo, the mine, and the submarine may be considered together because they have had a com-
mon origin and a closely associated development. . . . Closely related in function, these instruments
comprise a distinct kind of naval warfare, one in which the attack, during some phase of its delivery,
takes place beneath the surface of the sea. . . . By adopting these instruments, naval warfare entered
a new dimension measured in fathoms of depth. The water which had previously only supported the
vessels engaged in battle now became a medium for their concealment and for the transmission of
their most powerful thrusts.2
By submerging, submarines became invisible, allowing them to approach the most
powerful surface ship and deliver a torpedo, a weapon which outflanked the armor
provided as protection against gunfire, striking a ship below its waterline where it was
most vulnerable, allowing the smallest submarine to sink the largest battleship. This
combination of stealth and offensive punch has from the beginning been the defining
characteristic of the submarine.
The Holland is usually described as the first modern submarine because it was the first
design in which an internal combustion engine for surfaced operation was combined
with a battery-powered electric motor for submerged operation. Prior to this develop-
ment, submarines either combined steam plants with batteries or relied on batteries
alone. The former suffered from the tremendous heat generated by a steam plant in a
small platform like a submarine, while the latter provided only very limited range and
endurance. Submarines like the Holland were deployed by the major powers in the
years before World War I with an eye toward two missions: coastal defense and fleet co-
operation. As a coastal defense asset, submarines would greatly extend heretofore
gun-based coastal defenses that were centered on major ports. Together with mines,
submarines would therefore make close blockade of an enemy coast impossible,
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regardless of the imbalance in traditional naval forces. By forcing the dominant navy
away from the weaker adversary’s coast, the submarine helped create a sanctuary for
coastwise shipping and, more important in contemporary minds, the opportunity for
blockade running by both merchant shipping and commerce-raiding cruisers.
World War I and the First Battle
Submarines were also conceived as a new arm of the battle fleet, an instrument that
would operate in reasonably close concert with battleships. Again, in most schemes, the
submarine would aid the lesser battle line, which in fleeing from its stronger opponent
might lure the latter over a squadron of waiting submarines. Neither mission had the
effect anticipated for it in World War I. Submarines and mines did succeed in making
close blockade impossible, but distant blockade, depending increasingly on airborne
scouting platforms and communications intelligence, proved almost equally effective.
Thus, the Royal Navy was still able to effectively bottle up the German High Seas Fleet
throughout World War I. Battle fleet cooperation also proved difficult because subma-
rines had trouble keeping up with the battle line, and even when they did, coordination
in battle was impossible to ensure with any certainty. Instead, the major role played by
the submarine in World War I was as an independent commerce raider, a role which no
major naval power had seriously anticipated.
The Germans started World War I with only twenty-four U-boats. Their campaign
against Allied shipping did not begin until early 1915, and after several starts and stops,
unrestricted submarine warfare did not begin until February 1917. Over the next year,
the Allies lost more than 5.5 million tons of merchant shipping, a loss rate that sub-
stantially exceeded new construction.3 The U-boat threat was brought under control
during the last year of the war, primarily through the implementation by the Royal
Navy of escorted convoys, a measure that it had initially resisted. Convoying greatly
complicated the open-ocean search problem for German submarines, because a group
of ships was not much more likely to be found than a single ship, while escorts reduced
the damage that submarines could cause when they did succeed in finding ships to at-
tack. It is important to note that escorts were much less effective at actually destroying
submarines than they were at limiting their effectiveness by forcing them to submerge
after their initial attack, which generally allowed the rest of the convoy to escape.
The Allies, and particularly the Royal Navy, were unprepared for unrestricted subma-
rine warfare by German U-boats for three reasons. First, submarines did not become
capable of truly independent, long-range ocean patrols until their gasoline engines
were replaced by diesels, which gave them much longer range and the ability to keep up
with merchant ships while operating on the surface. Diesels were adopted by the major
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navies only in the years between 1907 and 1912 and were not widely deployed until the
war had already started.4
Second, international law barred unrestricted attacks in wartime against merchant
ships that were not carrying war-related cargoes. In order to comply with the law, all
warships, including submarines, had to first board and search a vessel and determine
its cargo, and then allow its crew to safely disembark before attacking. Clearly these
rules greatly hampered the submarine, and they were routinely violated by the Ger-
mans in operations near British waters aimed specifically at British ships even before
unrestricted operations came into full swing. But these so-called “prize rules” remained
largely in effect in operations against neutral shipping between 1914 and 1917, which
gave the British access to the merchant fleets of powerful maritime countries like the
United States. As long as these rules remained intact, it would be impossible for the
Germans to blockade Britain, but their abandonment would bring the United States
and other powers into the war. Thus, it was not unreasonable to expect the prize rules
to remain in effect, as indeed they did for more than half the war.
Third, once unrestricted submarine warfare was instituted, the British were initially
unprepared to take the steps necessary to counter it. An ASW strategy based on es-
corted convoys was a brute force method that reduced the efficiency of already strained
merchant fleets by keeping them idle until convoys could be formed, and which pro-
duced demands for escorts out of all proportion to the growing number of enemy sub-
marines. In the latter respect, the demand for convoy escorts competed with the
demand for fleet escorts, which were still needed by the British Grand Fleet because the
German High Seas Fleet remained in being.
In practice, the British were able to counter Germany’s resort to unrestricted subma-
rine warfare only with the help of the Americans, who provided them with additional
convoy escorts and merchant shipping, and who, with Britain, successfully pressured
the large merchant fleets of countries that remained neutral to continue operation even
after the prize rules were abandoned. Thus, Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare
campaign failed both because it brought the Americans into the war and because it
failed to knock other neutral merchant fleets out of the war. Therefore, in an important
sense, the political effects of the campaign negated its military effects, because Britain
probably would not have survived the First Battle of the Atlantic if the Royal Navy and
the British merchant marine had continued to face the U-boats on their own. As Ar-
thur Hezlet has noted, “The defeat of the U-boats was not because the guerre de course
(independent commerce raiding) could not by its nature be decisive: it was because the
Allies were able to be strong everywhere and make a gigantic effort.”5
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ASW in the Interwar Period
The submarines that fought World War I were surface ships which were expected to
submerge only in order to attack and escape better-armed surface targets, but which
also lost a considerable portion of their mobility and situational awareness when sub-
merged and, therefore, much of their potential offensive power. This characteristic was
of course based largely on technical constraints, but it was also a function of expecta-
tions about their primary mission, which was assumed in most cases to be coastal de-
fense or fleet cooperation, both of which contemplated attacks against major naval
assets, against which surface engagements were suicidal.
The German campaign against Allied merchant shipping demonstrated instead that at-
tacks against merchant ships could be most effectively prosecuted at night, on the sur-
face, at relatively close range, even in the face of escorts. The challenge was to maximize
the effects of these attacks, escape the escorts alerted by these attacks, and reengage.
Defined in this way, the operational demands placed on the “submersible” submarine
were less in conflict with its basic technical limitations than when the challenge was to
attack powerful naval vessels, as in the coastal defense or fleet cooperation missions.
This lesson drove the German submarine force toward the operational and tactical
methods it employed in its World War II guerre de course, which emphasized night
surface attacks by groups of submarines which would pursue individual convoys and
repeatedly attack them over a period of a week or two.
These “wolf pack” tactics were pioneered by German Nazi Admiral Karl Doenitz dur-
ing the interwar years. Wolf pack tactics did not demand a radically new type of sub-
marine, and German interwar submarine designs were evolutionary, emphasizing
longer range and endurance and larger torpedo salvos and magazines. The most im-
portant technical development that made wolf packs possible was the maturation of
high frequency (HF) radio as a command and control mechanism. HF radio provided
over-the-horizon performance from a relatively small, low-powered transmitter, and
allowed deployed submarines to report convoy sightings to a central command post,
which could then broadcast this information to all other submarines in that broad
ocean area, allowing them to marshal for a concentrated attack by a dozen or so sub-
marines. Using night surface attacks, these wolf packs would strike the convoy simulta-
neously, from multiple azimuths, with multiple torpedo salvos, and then slip away.
Many such attacks would be conducted over the course of several days, with the wolf
pack using the daylight hours to separate from the convoy and race ahead of it on the
surface to get into firing position for the following night.
The Royal Navy focused its interwar ASW development efforts on solving the World
War I problem, which was to protect convoys from lone German U-boats. The heart of
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the solution embraced was the first active sonar, originally called ASDIC after Allied
Submarine Detection Investigation Committee. During World War I, hydrophones had
been used by escorts to listen for submerged submarines. Sound traveled well under-
water, and submarines could often be heard at ranges of several miles, but in order to
use such passive sonar, escorts had to come to a complete stop to prevent their own
noise from drowning out the submarine signal. Furthermore, under even the best of
circumstances, passive sonar gave only a bearing to the target, not the range. Active so-
nar addressed both these problems and, combined with depth charges, appeared to give
the convoy escort a killing capability against submerged submarines that it had lacked
during World War I.
ASDIC produced confidence in the Royal Navy that it would be able to find submerged
submarines and either prevent them from attacking convoys or, at a minimum, kill
them after they did. This was ironic given that the German U-boat arm was preparing
for a second battle of the Atlantic that would largely occur on the surface, where AS-
DIC would be irrelevant. The two opponents were preparing for quite different battles,
but the consequences for the Royal Navy did not become immediately apparent until a
year or two into World War II.
World War II and the Second Battle
The war began as World War I had ended, with the Germans waging essentially unre-
stricted submarine warfare, and the British convoying in response. But the intensity of
the Second Battle was mitigated by the relatively low numbers of combatants available
to both sides and by the competing operational demands placed on these forces.
The German U-boat arm began the war with fifty-seven submarines, only twenty-
seven of which were oceangoing Type VIIs or IXs. With such a small force, wolf pack
tactics were impractical, and their full implementation awaited delivery of the large
number of submarines begun immediately before the war. Likewise, the Royal Navy
again began the war with a shortage of escorts, and these shortages were exacerbated by
losses in the Norwegian campaign and off Dunkirk in the spring and summer of 1940
as well as by the need to retain an anti-invasion force in being on the Channel Coast.
This initially limited the area of convoy coverage to waters east of 15 degrees W.
Between June and October 1940, in the first real battles with German U-boats, the Brit-
ish lost 1.4 million tons of merchant shipping. These losses were alarming for several
reasons, the most important being the fact that 30 percent of these losses were incurred
by ships in convoy. With a still small force, the Germans were demonstrating that AS-
DIC-equipped convoys were not effective, even against individual submarines attacking
on the surface at night. Matters quickly got much worse, as the U-boat force increased
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in numbers, allowing it to implement its wolf pack tactics in 1941, and as it gained ac-
cess in 1940 to French and Norwegian bases much closer to Allied shipping lanes.
Moreover, the expedient of simply increasing production of escorts so that all mer-
chant ships could be convoyed would no longer serve as a counter to German U-boats
as it had in World War I. Thus, even though Canadian participation gave convoys con-
tinuous surface escorts all the way across the Atlantic starting in May 1941, losses con-
tinued at a rate sufficient to exceed new merchant ship production.
The outcome of these initial battles between ASDIC-equipped convoy escorts and
U-boat wolf packs demonstrated that the Kriegsmarine had “won” the peacetime battle
over doctrine for the Second Battle of the Atlantic during the interwar period. Fortu-
nately, German submarines were not available in sufficient numbers at the outset of the
war to execute their doctrine. The wartime victory of the Allies in the Second Battle re-
sulted from ASW measures taken to counter the wolf packs after the war began. These
measures turned the tide in the spring and summer of 1943, and the U-boat menace
remained under control until the end of the war. The key to victory in the Second Bat-
tle was the introduction, beginning in 1942, of the radar-equipped ASW patrol aircraft.
Just as in World War I, where shipping losses plummeted once all merchant shipping was
organized into convoys with effective surface escorts, Allied shipping losses in World
War II declined sharply once all convoys were provided effective surface and air escorts.
The necessity for effective air escorts became clear soon after the war began, when it
became apparent that the German U-boat arm had adopted anti-convoy tactics that
emphasized surface operations. Meeting this demand required both technical innova-
tion and, perhaps more important, a commitment by political leaders to a strategy that
emphasized both the European theater and the primacy of the battle for control of the
Atlantic within that theater.
Technically, the success of air ASW in the Second Battle resulted from the marriage of
microwave radar with very long-range bombardment aircraft. Radar allowed aircraft to
detect surfaced submarines at ranges of twenty to thirty miles, and very long-range air-
craft eliminated the gaps in air coverage over the Atlantic that existed during the first
three years of the war. Air ASW patrols greatly expanded the radius around a convoy in
which it was dangerous for a U-boat to surface, and it was the ability of U-boats to op-
erate on the surface near convoys that was the basis for the wolf pack tactic. Forced to
submerge, the U-boat lost much of its tactical mobility as well as its ability to commu-
nicate, and therefore lost much of its offensive punch as well.
Despite these advantages, it was still a struggle to close the air ASW gaps over the At-
lantic because radar-equipped, long-range aircraft were also the means of prosecuting
the strategic bombardment campaign, which was the core mission of both the Royal
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Air Force and the U.S. Army Air Forces, the services which owned the very long-range
aircraft in question, and because strategic bombardment was viewed by American,
British, and Soviet political leaders as the only significant means of engaging in offen-
sive operations against Germany in the West prior to the planned invasion of France.
By the spring of 1943 the main Atlantic air gap was finally closed, primarily by radar-
equipped B-24 Liberators flying out of Newfoundland, Iceland, and Northern Ireland.6
The central importance of closing the air gap should not be allowed to obscure the
other almost equally important factors which influenced the outcome of the Second
Battle. These can be broadly lumped into two general categories: the development of
ocean-wide operational intelligence systems for ASW and the mobilization of civilian
scientific and technical expertise in support of the overall ASW effort. The first devel-
opment encompasses the broad area of electronic and communications intelligence
(HF/DF and Ultra), its fusion ashore with other information in order to produce an
up-to-date, ocean-wide picture of German U-boat operations, and the timely use of
this information both as a means to redirect convoys away from wolf packs, and later as
a mechanism for cueing offensive ASW assets against U-boats.
Wolf pack tactics depended on the central coordination of U-boat operations from a
shore-based command center, and therefore entailed extensive two-way radio commu-
nications between deployed U-boats and headquarters. These transmissions could be
located using shore and later sea-based direction-finding nets, thereby providing the
rough locations of deployed U-boats, and the messages could themselves be decrypted
using Ultra, intermittently, for the first three and a half years of the war and continu-
ously thereafter. During the first three years of the war, the Germans were also inter-
mittently reading messages concerning Allied convoy operations, but the British
discovered this weakness at about the same point when it permanently solved the prob-
lem of decrypting German naval Enigma transmissions. By contrast, the Germans never
accepted that their codes had been broken and never fully comprehended the degree to
which radio transmissions by their submarines were exploited by Allied HF/DF nets.7
In addition to playing an important role in the establishment and operation of this op-
erational intelligence system, mobilized civilian scientific and technological expertise
also made two additional contributions to the Second Battle. It led to the panoply of
increasingly sophisticated ASW weapons and tactical sensors that were developed and
deployed after the war began, and the use of operations analysis as a tool for optimiz-
ing tactics and operations and for anticipating the effects of countermeasures.
Regarding weapon and sensor development, many of the tools of the Third Battle were
born or first exploited by the Allies in the crucible of the early years of World War II,
including obviously microwave radar, but also acoustic homing torpedoes such as the
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air-delivered Mk. 24 “Mine,” magnetic anomaly detectors (MAD), sonobuoys, and
ship-board HF/DF antennas. Operations analysis was a potent tool for combining and
optimizing the effects of the complex combinations of platforms, sensors, and weapons
at both the tactical and operational levels made possible by this technological cornuco-
pia. In both cases, new weapons and new, more rigorous ways of analyzing their effects
were key instruments in the prosecution of high technology warfare of which the Sec-
ond Battle of the Atlantic was one of the harbingers, along with the strategic air war
over Europe.
But victory by Allied ASW forces in the Second Battle masked the growing imbalance
favoring the submarine over ASW forces that hunted it. In World War II, the Allied
ASW effort necessary to defeat the U-boat was even more disproportionate to the size
of the submarine threat than it was in World War I. At its peak in 1917, the German
U-boat arm had 140 submarines in service, and they faced almost 200 operational
Allied surface convoy escorts. In World War II, the peak number of U-boats opera-
tional was 240 in March 1943, and this force faced in the Royal Navy alone approxi-
mately 875 ASDIC-equipped escorts, 41 escort carriers, and 300 Coastal Command
patrol aircraft.8 The price of sea control was growing substantially faster than the price
of contesting it, and the growing asymmetry manifest in the aforementioned numbers
ignored the fact that in technical terms a great leap forward in German submarine ca-
pabilities came just too late to affect the Second Battle.
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Phase I of the Third Battle
The German Type XXI and the Early Cold War, 1945–1950
The Cold War ASW battle between the United States and the Soviet Union can be di-
vided for our purposes into four stages, corresponding roughly to four major steps for-
ward in Soviet submarine design. These major steps were their adaptation of the
German Type XXI diesel-electric, their first nuclear-powered submarine, their first
high-performance nuclear submarine, and their first very quiet nuclear submarine.
Concurrent with these submarine design developments were a series of both real and
anticipated submarine weapon developments, including the first introduction of nu-
clear weapons, their deployment on submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles
for land attack, the development of first nuclear and then conventional antishipping
missiles, and the development of long-range nuclear ballistic missiles. Finally, the Third
Battle was constrained by a relatively constant maritime and political geography that
also played an important role.
Each phase in the evolution of Soviet submarine capabilities created a new challenge
for American ASW forces, and the next four sections briefly assess how well each such
challenge was met, focusing on identifying innovations in technology and doctrine for
ASW when they occurred.
The Second Battle ended as the Germans were deploying a new type of submarine de-
signed to counter the ASW techniques used by the Allies to defeat their wolf packs op-
erating on the surface. Known as the Type XXI, it combined three design changes to
enable a radically new operational approach focused on submerged operations. These
changes were greater battery capacity, a hull form more hydrodynamically suited to
high underwater speed, and a snorkel allowing the main diesel engine to breathe from
periscope depth.
The Type XXI undermined each element of the Allied ASW posture that won the Sec-
ond Battle. The snorkel, which had a much lower radar cross section than a surfaced
submarine, gave the submarine back its tactical mobility. That is, it could once again
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move at speed on its main engine for great distances without molestation by air ASW
forces. A more hydrodynamic hull and greater battery power allowed a completely sub-
merged submarine to go faster for longer than before, allowing it to escape prosecution
by sonar-equipped convoy escorts once it had revealed its position by attacking.
At the operational level, Type XXIs deployed in sufficient numbers to blanket the North
Atlantic shipping lanes would minimize the need for shore-based command and control,
and, to the extent that two-way communications between deployed submarines and
headquarters remained necessary, they could be executed using the new “kurier” burst
transmission technology introduced by the Germans at the end of World War II. Burst
transmissions compress HF signals enough to make it difficult to DF them. Combined
with the likely absence of a code-breaking triumph, such as Ultra, a future battle of the
Atlantic would therefore be prosecuted without much of the operational intelligence of
opposing submarine operations that the Allies enjoyed in the Second Battle.
Type XXIs had fallen into American, British, and Soviet hands after World War II, and
the U.S. Navy rapidly discovered that it would face a major ASW challenge were the
Soviet Navy to build large numbers of ocean-going Type XXIs. In anticipation of this
threat, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Chester W. Nimitz identified ASW as equal
in importance to dealing with the threat of atomic attack.9 The resulting ASW response
to the fast snorkel threat initially unfolded in two basic directions: an evolutionary
path that sought to repair the ASW team that won the Second Battle and a more revo-
lutionary path that aspired to replace it.
The evolutionary response to the fast snorkel boat emphasized at the technical level
better radars for air ASW assets, better active sonars for surface escorts, and better
weapons for both, along with a tightly integrated tactical approach that sought to ex-
ploit the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of each ASW platform. This ap-
proach took advantage of the fact that a snorkel boat still was not a true submarine in
that it remained at least partially wedded to the surface, albeit in a fashion that greatly
reduced its vulnerability.
The more revolutionary response introduced both a new sensor and a new platform
into the ASW equation. The new sensor was the passive acoustic array, and the new
platform was the ASW submarine, or SSK. American passive acoustic array develop-
ment grew out of earlier German developments, in this case the GHG array first used
on a limited basis as a torpedo-self-defense sensor on German surface ships, and later
adapted for use by Type XXIs as a means of tracking and targeting surface ships for
torpedo attack while submerged. Fortuitously, the U.S. Navy discovered in early post-
war exercises that submarines were quite loud when snorkeling. Compared to a surface
ship, a snorkeling sub put all of its machinery noise into the water because it was
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submerged, and if it was to make best progress during transits to and from its operat-
ing areas or keep up with a fast convoy, it needed to operate at speeds well past the on-
set of propeller cavitation at such shallow depths. For both reasons, it was an excellent
target for a quiet platform deploying a large, low-frequency passive array.
The submarine, in turn, was ideal as such a platform for two reasons, one technical and
one strategic. On battery, essentially hovering in place, a submarine introduced the
least possible self-noise into the passive array, thereby maximizing the signal-to-noise
ratio and therefore the detection range. Direct path detection ranges against snorkelers
of 10–15 miles were achieved in this manner in exercises by essentially unmodified
World War II fleet boats in the late 1940s. Equally important, the submarine’s inherent
stealth, combined with the maritime geography of the emerging Cold War, made it
particularly suited for forward operations in the somewhat constricted waters through
which Soviet submarines had to proceed with some dispatch in order both to gain ac-
cess to the North Atlantic and to do so with transit times short enough to give reason-
able endurance in the patrol area.
Both the evolutionary and revolutionary responses to the Type XXI threat began soon
after World War II, when little was known about the nature of the Soviet submarine
threat. It was simply expected that the Soviets, a continental power like Germany with
both limited access to and dependence upon the sea, would focus their maritime efforts
on interdicting Allied sea lines of communication by deploying a large force of modern
submarines. Combined with this relative vacuum of intelligence was a period in the
five years between World War II and Korea of very low defense spending in the United
States. Despite the lack of intelligence and the extreme scarcity of resources, the Navy
placed substantial emphasis on ASW and made significant progress.
The Evolutionary Response to the Type XXI
The evolutionary response focused on two technical challenges: the need to improve
snorkel detection by airborne radar and the need to improve the performance of sur-
face ship sonars against faster, deeper diving targets. Snorkels presented a much smaller
radar cross section to a searching radar and were also harder to detect amongst sea
clutter, while the fixed “searchlight” sonars of World War II could not be trained fast
enough to keep up with a submarine moving at ten or fifteen knots. By 1950, the
APS-20 radar had recovered much of the detection range lost when snorkels first ar-
rived, and the QHB scanning sonar had improved the ability of a surface ship to hold a
submerged contact, but the ASW situation remained troublesome, according to several
contemporary analyses of the problem.
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For example, the Hartwell report noted that despite its success, the performance of the
APS-20 needed continued improvement because “we have no assurance that the ranges
we are now obtaining against our own snorkels and copies of the German snorkel can
be duplicated against the Soviet snorkel. Evidence regarding the efficacy of snorkel
camouflage is still fragmentary, but we feel that a moderately vigorous Russian effort to
exploit geometrical camouflage could probably reduce our range seriously. In the long
run, then, we see the radar-vs.-submarine contest as an unequal one, with the subma-
rine eventually the winner.”10 Similar pessimism attached to the active sonar-versus-
submarine contest as well as to the equally important area of ASW weapons, where the
capabilities of the Soviet systems produced by the imaginations of American engineers
always exceeded the American systems actually available to counter them.
This pessimism helped leave the door ajar for other approaches to the ASW problem.
Thus, one of the major conclusions of the Hartwell report was that small, tactical nu-
clear weapons should be developed so that carrier aircraft could strike Soviet subma-
rines in port at the source, a strategy which had failed in World War II because of the
fortifications produced by the Germans at their U-boat ports, which survived repeated
and massive attacks by even the largest conventional bombs. It also discussed the possi-
bility of ASW submarines and fixed surveillance systems utilizing passive acoustics to
detect snorkeling submarines at long ranges of as much as 100 miles.
A More Radical Response to the Type XXI
Passive acoustic-based ASW methods grew out of discoveries about low-frequency
sound propagation in the sea made during and immediately after World War II. One
key discovery, made by Maurice Ewing and J. Lamar Worzel, was of a deep sound chan-
nel that trapped and focused low-frequency sound, allowing it to propagate over great
distances. It was abstracted as follows when first discussed in the open literature in 1948:
Experiments are described to demonstrate a new method of sonic signaling at extremely long ranges
in the oceans, utilizing the natural sound channel. Signals were made by causing a 4-lb. charge of TNT
to explode at about 4000-foot depth. These signals have the following qualities:
1) Extremely long-range transmission (probably 10,000 miles).
2) Signal is positively identifiable.
3) Abrupt termination of the signal allows the arrival time to be read with an accuracy better than
0.05 second. This permits location of the source to within a mile, if the signal is received at three
suitably located stations.
4) The relation of signal duration to distance is such that the distance may be estimated to 30 miles in
1000 from reception at a single station
The limitations are:
1. The great-circle path which the sound follows between source and receiver must lie entirely in
deep water (probably at least 1000 fathoms).
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2. Sound travels in water at about 1 mile per second, so that the interval between the origin of the
signal and its reception becomes sufficiently great to be a handicap for some uses. . . .11
The so-called SOFAR (SOund Fixing And Ranging) channel was first used as a means
of locating downed aviators at sea,12 then as a missile impact location system,13 but its
most important application came in the form of SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System),
the network of seabed listening arrays deployed by the Navy to listen for submarines in
the deep, SOFAR channel. SOSUS began as a crash program by Bell Labs in October
1950 under the direction of the Navy’s Office of Naval Research.14
But even before SOSUS was developed, the submarine force had begun looking explic-
itly at the utility of ASW submarines, or SSKs, using passive, low-frequency acoustic
arrays. This effort began soon after World War II as part of a general search by the sub-
marine force for new missions and was formalized under Project Kayo in 1949. Kayo
included the establishment of Submarine Development Group 2 (SubDevGru 2),
which was tasked with “solving the problem of using submarines to detect and destroy
enemy submarines.”15 In 1952, the first submarines explicitly designed for that mis-
sion—SSKs 1-3—became available. Their key attribute was a big, low-frequency bow
array, the BQR-4. The first use of the BQR-4 in exercises produced stunning results. In
the words of K-1’s first skipper:
USS K-1, off Bermuda in 1952, picked up a snorkeling exercise submarine at 30 miles, a range previ-
ously unknown to me, its CO, and my fire control party. The K-1 stayed at battle stations for five
hours expecting every minute, after the first 15 minutes of tracking, for the bearing-rate to break and
the target to go by. Can you imagine it?  JT ranges from 4000 to 10,000 yards until 1952: and then in
one Fleet exercise period, BQR-4 ranges out to 30 miles.16
This was the convergence zone phenomenon, another characteristic of low-frequency
sound propagation which led to concentric rings of increased sound pressure levels at
25 to 30-mile intervals around a sound source. With the ability to detect snorkelers at
one or even two convergence zones, SSKs could be used to form barriers off enemy
ports and across geographic choke points such as the Bear Island-Norway gap or the
Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. Still, even with such long detection ranges, a bar-
rier strategy would demand large numbers of submarines, and the K-1 and its two sis-
ters were designed as mobilization ships to be produced in operationally significant
numbers only in war. Meanwhile, existing fleet boats were given SSK conversions, using
the somewhat less effective BQR-2.
The SSK led also to collaborative experiments with the maritime patrol VP community.
This in turn led to the formation of VP/SSK barriers where a line of SSKs made the ini-
tial detection and cued the faster VP aircraft for the actual prosecution and kill of the
contact. Such VP/SSK barriers were adopted in actual war plans during the early 1950s
and were still part of CINCLANT’s operational repertoire in October 1962, when a
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sub-air barrier containing ten SSKs was established off Argentia, Newfoundland, dur-
ing the Cuban Missile Crisis.17
The Lag in Soviet Submarine Development
Viewed over the same five-year period between the end of World War II and Korea, the
Soviet Navy’s exploitation of the Type XXI lagged significantly behind U.S. Navy intel-
ligence forecasts, which initially foresaw in 1946 a force of 300 Soviet Type XXI equiva-
lents by 1950.18 It was not until 1949 that the first postwar Soviet submarine designs
went to sea. Two classes were deployed, the Whiskey and the Zulu. The Zulu was a true
Type XXI, equipped with a snorkel, capable of 16 knots submerged, and possessing the
size, habitability, and range necessary for long-range, blue-water interdiction opera-
tions. But only 21 Zulus were commissioned between 1949 and 1958. During the same
period, 236 Whiskeys were commissioned, but the Whiskey was a smaller, less capable,
shorter-range boat, designed more with an eye toward coastal defense and European lit-
toral operations. Furthermore, it was not until the mid-1950s that Whiskeys were even
given snorkels. Certainly the Soviet Navy was showing an emphasis on submarines dur-
ing this period, but it deployed them neither in the numbers nor the quality expected.
This disconnect between the U.S. Navy’s expectations and actual Soviet naval behavior
helps to highlight several unexpected characteristics of the Navy’s ASW response to the
Soviet Type XXI threat during the first five years of the Third Battle. First, the fact that
there was a response at all is somewhat of a puzzle, given the prior record of interwar
ASW activity by the major Western navies. In a time of great budgetary scarcity and
with a relative lack of hard intelligence about the threat, the U.S. Navy had identified
ASW as one of its two most important missions and had taken steps in peacetime to
counter a new challenge in that mission area. Second, the nature of the first steps taken
to counter the new ASW challenge is also interesting in that those steps contained both
evolutionary and more innovative elements. The U.S. Navy did not simply attempt to
repair the damage done to its traditional air-surface ASW team by the Type XXI, but it
also explored new ASW techniques and new ASW platforms, prominent among these
being passive acoustics and the ASW submarine, or SSK. Third, by 1950 when the first
Soviet Type XXIs were being deployed, both the traditional and the more innovative
ASW approaches to this threat had already demonstrated considerable success. Thus,
even as traditional air-surface hunter killer groups and convoy escorts began to recover
some if not all of their capabilities against the snorkel boat, the submarine force was
leading in the development of another set of passive acoustic-based methods that
added a new tool to the ASW arsenal. This new tool grew dramatically in importance
during the next phase of the Third Battle.
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Phase II of the Third Battle
ASW and the Two Nuclear Revolutions, 1950–1960
The 1949–1950 time frame was arguably the most important period during the Third
Battle for three reasons. First, it was in 1949 that the Soviets exploded their first nuclear
weapon, well in advance of many American estimates of when that ominous event
would occur. This was the first nuclear revolution. The significance of this event for
ASW was that the submarine was an obvious delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons,
which made ASW even more important than Admiral Nimitz had said in 1946, because
ASW was now also an important element in the defense of the United States against
nuclear attack. Second, it was also in 1949 that the U.S. Navy decided to go ahead with
a project to develop the nuclear-powered submarine. This second nuclear revolution,
when adopted by the Soviet Navy, would pose an even more daunting ASW challenge
than had the Type XXI, making ASW much more difficult just as the first nuclear revo-
lution was making ASW much more important. Third, it was in 1950 with the outbreak
of the Korean War that the U.S.-Soviet Cold War truly began. One consequence was a
permanent, fourfold increase in the steady-state level of defense spending that the United
States would maintain throughout the Cold War, a necessary but by no means sufficient
step towards toward fashioning a new ASW response to a much greater threat.
The body of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the significance for ASW of
the second revolution, the nuclear submarine. Before turning to that discussion, it is
important to explain the context established by the first Soviet nuclear detonation and
the Korean War.
The Submarine as a Nuclear Weapons Carrier
The first nuclear revolution subsumed ASW in the larger problem of protecting the
continental United States from nuclear attack. Strange as it may sound to a generation
of Americans used to concepts such as nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruc-
tion, the early Cold War years were witness to many attempts to preserve the societal
invulnerability which geography and political isolation had bestowed on the United
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States before the arrival of nuclear weapons. These attempts drew on national re-
sources controlled by the highest political and military leaders, and when ASW became
associated with that effort, it also became a national mission.
Once again, the relative lack of intelligence about Soviet efforts to make submarines
into nuclear delivery vehicles did not prevent speculation that they were doing so.
Thus, in 1950, the CIA noted an unconfirmed report “that the only atomic bomb the
Soviets have been able to produce would have to be delivered by submarine.”19 Indeed,
the U.S. Navy had already experimented successfully in 1947 with launching a V-1-type
cruise missile from the Cusk, a converted Gato-class diesel submarine. The success of
this experiment led to Regulus, a 400-mile, submarine-launched, nuclear cruise missile
that began flight tests in 1951. Similar experiments by the Soviets were reported by the
Office of Naval Intelligence during the 1950s, including conversions of Whiskeys into
cruise missile submarines (SSGs) and Zulus into ballistic missile submarines (SSBs).20
In the words of Project Nobska, a mid–1950s successor to the Project Hartwell study,
“Confronted with quiet submarines of long endurance, a sufficiently accurate means of
navigation, and suitable weapons, a defense against shore bombardment by submarines
becomes a huge problem. Even the partial defense of a long coastline requires a very
large effort.”21
In the event, the first Soviet missile submarine deployments by Hotels (SSBNs) and
Golfs (SSBs) did not occur until the early 1960s, but it had already become U.S. na-
tional policy to counter such systems before they were deployed. For example, in dis-
cussions of whether it was necessary to speed up research and development on
strategic ASW at the outset of the Kennedy administration, existing national policy was
quoted as follows:
Until technology permits the deployment of an effective active defense against submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, the principal measures of protection should be provided by the capability to attack
prior to launch. . . . [Accordingly,] the United States should strive to achieve and maintain an effective
and integrated sea surveillance system that permits detection and tracking of surface ships and subma-
rines operating within missile-launching range of the North American continent; and should improve
its related anti-submarine capability.22
Thus, the prospect of Soviet nuclear-armed SSGs and SSBs arose in American minds
soon after the first Soviet nuclear detonation, and this prospect elevated ASW to a mis-
sion of truly national importance during the 1950s. Because of Korea and the resources
it made available, the DOD-wide budgetary penury that had characterized the previous
five years also ended, and the services were able to fund projects which would have
been impossible otherwise.
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The True Submarine
Yet the growing importance of ASW and the resources now available to invest in it do
not explain the roughly contemporary decision by the U.S. Navy to begin the naval re-
actor program. The decision in 1949, before Korea, to develop naval nuclear reactors
had multiple, independent origins, some of which are of no concern to this story. But
one important element in this decision concerned the obvious utility of a nuclear
power plant for the achievement of a true submarine. The pursuit of the true subma-
rine, one that needed no umbilical to the surface and could remain completely sub-
merged while on patrol, had been a dream of submarine designers from the days of the
Holland. On the other hand, the attraction of such a submarine to the U.S. submarine
force lay not in its utility for ASW but in the immunity it would grant that force to op-
posing ASW forces. USS Nautilus was certainly not conceived by the U.S. Navy as a
counter to the nuclear submarine. Instead, as its capabilities first became apparent,
Nautilus provided an indication of how difficult ASW would soon become when the
Soviets deployed their own nuclear submarines.
These fears were confirmed in 1955 when the U.S. Navy’s ASW forces first encountered
Nautilus in her initial post-commissioning exercises. In one such exercise her perfor-
mance was described as follows:
Running at 24 knots and reattacking surface ships at will, she made simulated attacks on 16
ships. . . . On one occasion, she detected a carrier and her escorts steaming almost directly away at 20
knots. To reach an attacking position she steamed 219 nautical miles in 10.25 hours; 16 hours after
this attack, she struck a lone destroyer 240 nautical miles away.23
She was hard to find because she never had to snorkel and so fast that active sonars
could not keep their beams focused on her. Her speed and three dimensional maneu-
verability also allowed her to simply outrun existing homing torpedoes, the design ba-
sis threat for which was a snorkeling diesel traveling at no more than 8 knots and
maneuvering in only two dimensions. In short, she completely undermined almost all
the ASW progress made in the previous ten years to counter the Type XXI snorkel
boat. Key to this effort would be the more innovative approaches to ASW based on
passive acoustics.
Passive acoustics became so important because Nautilus was loud, and unlike diesel-
electrics, which were only intermittently loud because of their periodic need to snorkel,
early nuclear submarines like Nautilus were loud all the time, particularly in the
low-frequency part of the sound spectrum, because of items like reactor coolant
pumps which operated continuously whenever the reactor was providing power, and
reduction gears, which were needed to reduce steam turbine shaft output revolutions.
This was a potential chink in the nuclear submarine’s armor, and it would quickly be-
come the key to a completely revamped U.S. Navy ASW posture in which nuclear
T H E T H I R D B A T T L E 2 1
submarines, long-range patrol aircraft, and SOSUS arrays would be the dominant
tools. Before describing the evolution of this posture, it is important to pause here for a
brief general description of passive acoustics and its role in ASW. Following that will be
sections devoted to the development during the mid and late 1950s of SOSUS, nuclear
submarines optimized for ASW, and long-range maritime patrol aircraft (VP) opti-
mized for prosecuting SOSUS contacts. The last section will discuss the surface com-
munity’s ambivalent attitude toward the ASW challenge posed by nuclear submarines.
Passive Acoustics in ASW
Like radio and radar, sound occurs on a spectrum of frequencies.24 High-frequency,
short wavelength signals attenuate more quickly but can be detected with good angular
resolution by small antennas, while low-frequency, long wavelength signals propagate
further but require antennas with much larger apertures in order to achieve directional
reception. To detect a signal, it must be distinguishable from any background noise,
whether in the propagation medium, i.e., the ocean or in the receiver itself. The key
variable that determines whether detection occurs is the signal-to-noise ratio. There
are two basic approaches to maximizing the signal-to-noise ratios achieved by a
sonar—antenna gain and processing gain.
Because the optimum diameter or aperture of an antenna varies directly with wave-
length, very low-frequency sound reception is maximized by antennas with very wide
apertures, which means that sonars designed to detect low frequency sound must be
large. This explains the big bow arrays on the early SSKs, and it also explains the use of
long line arrays for SOSUS. In the former case, the “gain” of the array was limited by
the need to fit it on the bow of a submarine, whereas in the latter case, fixed, ocean
floor arrays 1,000 feet in length were used, which maximized the antenna gain possible
against even the lowest frequency signals.
High gain antennas increase the signal-to-noise ratio by nulling out reception of noise
from all directions except that of the main beam of the antenna, but noise within the
main beam remains. Thus, even when the main beam of such an array is pointing directly
at a submarine, there is noise that competes with the submarine’s acoustic signature, and
at long ranges this noise can still mask the submarine signal and prevent detection. Fur-
ther filtering of this noise depends on signal processing within the sonar itself.
This processing usually exploits the fact that a submarine’s signature contains both a
continuous, broadband spectrum of sound as well as discrete narrowband tonals at
specific frequencies along that spectrum that rise above it.25 These tonals are caused by
specific pieces of rotating machinery within the submarine, such as pumps, generators,
and gears, whereas the continuous broadband spectrum is caused primarily by flow
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noise over the hull surface or by propeller cavitation. A submarine’s broadband signa-
ture resembles background noise in that it contains a continuous spectrum of frequen-
cies within which sound source levels at particular frequencies rise and fall in random
fashion around a mean, over time. By contrast, the narrowband component of a sub-
marine’s signature generates sound at several specific frequencies continuously. Thus,
compared to the background noise generated at these specific frequencies, which will
average out over time to x, the signal plus noise received at the tonal frequency will av-
erage out over time to x + y, with y being the source level of the signal. In order to lis-
ten for these specific tonals, a sonar is given a spectrum analyzer that passes an
incoming broadband signal through a set of narrowband filters tuned to the frequen-
cies of interest. Narrowband processing will detect signal y as long as it remains high
enough to be reliably distinguished from the background noise x.26 When first used in
the early 1950s, it was given the name LOFAR (LOw Frequency Analysis and Ranging).
The significance of LOFAR was that it provided an additional, very powerful tool for
increasing acoustic signal-to-noise ratios. For example, at close range, a simple sonar
will detect a submarine’s broadband signal simply by pointing the main beam of its an-
tenna at the submarine. The sonar is measuring all the sound it receives in a given di-
rection, including both signal and background noise, and as it points in the direction
of the target, the signal increases. As the range to the opposing submarine is increased,
the relative strength of this broadband signature compared to the broadband back-
ground noise declines until it is drowned out and the signal-to-noise ratio drops below
the detection threshold.
Using LOFAR, the same sonar would filter out most of the sound received by its main
beam and focus only on those low-frequency tonals where the submarine’s source lev-
els were highest. In those narrow frequency bins, the part of the submarine’s sound sig-
nature that propagates furthest is competing only with the background noise that
exists at that frequency rather than the entire broadband noise spectrum, and the sonar
can therefore detect that narrow component of the submarine’s overall sound spec-
trum at much greater ranges before noise drowns it out.
The effectiveness of passive sonars depends also on the relative position of the sound
source and the sonar, and on the self-noise generated by the sonar platform. In the first
case, the important variable is the existence of layers in the ocean which both reflect
and absorb sound that strikes them at any but the steepest angles. In particular, there is
normally a so-called surface layer ranging from several tens to several hundred feet
deep, depending on location and seasonal variations. Most sound generated above this
layer stays trapped above it and rapidly attenuates as it bounces back and forth between
the surface and the layer itself. Only the sound that strikes the layer at a steep angle
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penetrates it. In deep water, this sound is then captured and focused by the SOFAR
channel. A passive sonar below the layer is therefore far more effective than one that is
above the layer, because the signal it seeks to detect will travel much further. Conver-
gence zones, where sound from the SOFAR channel returns and is focused at the sur-
face at approximately 25-mile intervals, are an important exception to this rule, and it
is also possible to cover the area between the limit of direct path propagation and the
first convergence zone using bottom bounce techniques.27
Self-noise is also an important issue for sonar effectiveness for obvious reasons. Any
sonar attached to a loud platform will perform less well than the same sonar attached
to a quiet one. This is true regardless of whether one is seeking broadband or
narrowband detections. Self-noise can be minimized both by reducing speed and
through explicit attempts to design a more quiet platform. The methods used to quiet
sonar platforms become more elaborate later in this story, but low speed was a factor
from the beginning. Furthermore, speed and depth variations between target and
source can reinforce each other.
Thus, one key to the passive acoustic approach to ASW at the outset of the Third Battle
was the fact that Soviet diesel subs snorkeled on their diesels at 8 knots during long
transits to and from ocean patrol areas. At speeds lower than 8 knots, the time spent in
transit would simply grow too long, but while traveling near the surface at 8 knots and
above, submarine propellers cavitate. By contrast, an SSK patrolling on battery at depth
in the path of the snorkeler would neither be cavitating nor putting diesel machinery
noise into the water, which would both maximize its detection range and minimize its
counter-detection range. Under that particular set of circumstances, the SSK would
have a formidable acoustic advantage.
To return to the ASW challenge posed by nuclear weapons and the nuclear submarine,
passive acoustics, both broadband and narrowband, became an important element of
the response in three areas—ocean surveillance, submarine versus submarine opera-
tions, and maritime patrol (VP) operations. Ocean surveillance for ASW was revolu-
tionized by the development and deployment of SOSUS. Submarine versus submarine
ASW underwent a similar revolution as a result of the rapid development and deploy-
ment of the Thresher, the first quiet nuclear submarine. And finally, the VP community
underwent a revolution when it shifted from operations cued by HF/DF that used
radar to search for surfaced or snorkeling submarines, to operations in which SOSUS
provided the cueing data and acoustic sonobuoys were used to search the datum for
submerged submarines.
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Ocean Surveillance
SOSUS was initially developed to provide warning of Soviet submarines approaching
the continental United States. Two groups led the initial developments: Project Jezebel
at Bell Labs, and Project Michael at Columbia University’s Hudson Lab.28 The first test
SOSUS array was installed by Western Electric at Eleuthera in the Bahamas in 1951. Its
success led to a decision in 1952 to install arrays along the entire eastern seaboard, fol-
lowed by a decision in 1954 to do the same along the Pacific coast and off Hawaii. By
1958, these efforts were completed, and in 1959, an array was installed off Argentia,
Newfoundland.
SOSUS arrays consisted of hydrophones spaced along undersea cables laid at the axis of
the deep sound channel roughly normal to the direction that the array was to listen.
The cables were brought ashore at Naval Facilities (or NavFacs), where the signals they
received were processed. Evaluation centers were established to assess the processed
data from the NavFacs and combine it with other surveillance information, such as
from HF/DF nets.
SOSUS was designed to maximize detection ranges of the low-frequency part of a sub-
marine’s spectrum. Deployed at the axis of the SOFAR channel, the arrays were opti-
mally located to exploit its focusing effects. Their 1,000-foot apertures maximized array
gain against even the lowest frequencies. And finally, SOSUS was the first ASW system to
fully exploit narrowband signal analysis in order to maximize processing gain.
Initially, SOSUS was begun on the basis of experiments against surface ships in which
broadband, low-frequency cavitation was detected at ranges of roughly 100 miles.29 The
introduction of narrowband signal processing gave the same arrays detection ranges
that could extend clear across entire ocean basins under some circumstances. LOFAR
also allowed for more sophisticated tracking techniques. For example, two of the most
important tonals in a submarine’s signature were those modulated by the propeller at
the rate at which its blades turned and those associated with particular items of rotat-
ing machinery. Blade rate tonals were usually slightly lower in frequency than machin-
ery tonals, and both were usually aspect dependent and speed dependent. Taken
together, these gave SOSUS the ability to detect and classify targets at extreme ranges
and to track them over time. SOSUS’ ability to locate targets depended on a variety of
factors, including the range of the detection, the number of separate arrays providing a
bearing to the same target, and the length of the baseline separating them. Under the
best of circumstances, SOSUS cued operational forces to probability areas, or SPAs, in
which the tactical ASW asset then had to search for and reacquire the contact. SPAs
could be very large, particularly when they were relatively distant from the nearest
array, meaning that successful SOSUS cueing was not automatic. In addition, there was
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a fairly high false alarm rate, meaning that ASW assets often spent considerable time
“prosecuting” merchant ships and marine life.
SOSUS became a part of a larger ocean surveillance system, and inputs from other ele-
ments of this system remained important to the ASW problem. Certainly, HF/DF re-
mained an important component of the ocean surveillance system, though unlike
SOSUS, details about HF/DF and other forms of signals intelligence (SIGINT) during
the Cold War remain classified.30 The timely fusion of all of these inputs and diffusion
of the resulting operation intelligence to the operating forces remained as important in
the Third Battle as it had been in the Second Battle, where success had ultimately de-
pended on organizations like the U.S. Navy’s Tenth Fleet.31 Yet, as in the Second Battle,
effective ocean surveillance systems did not guarantee tactical success.
The Submarine as an ASW Platform
At the tactical level, as was discussed in the previous section, the submarine force was
the first community to fully embrace the passive acoustic approach to ASW. The devel-
opment of this approach during the 1950s culminated in the deployment in 1960 of
the Thresher/Permits, the first quiet nuclear submarines. The Permits brought together
in one platform what had initially been three largely independent strands of develop-
ment in the submarine force.
First, the submarine force had emerged from World War II victorious but without a
new enemy. The Soviet Union was a continental power which did not rely on the sea,
and it lacked both a large surface navy and an oceangoing merchant marine. Therefore,
the beginning of the Third Battle saw the U.S. submarine force searching for new mis-
sions, including troop carriers, radar pickets, SSGs, and SSBs. By 1949, with the formal
establishment of Project Kayo, ASW was included among the potential new missions,
and SSKs became a part of the initial response to the Type XXI threat.
The idea behind an SSK was to put the biggest, low-frequency array on the bow of the
smallest, simplest submarine and send it forward to form barriers at choke points
across the transit routes of Soviet XXIs leaving and returning from Murmansk and
Vladivostok. The concept of operation was for the barrier to have SSKs spaced one or
two convergence zones apart, such that each could cover its assigned station while es-
sentially hovering on battery, providing the optimum conditions for maximum passive
array performance. This generated a requirement for an enormous number of subma-
rines, which explained the desire for a simple design that could be mass produced, the
idea being that there would still be a mobilization approach to achieving the necessary
number of ASW assets, as there had been in the past.
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The first nuclear revolution helped to bury this concept, since countering nuclear-
armed Soviet submarines would clearly require an adequate ASW capability when war
began. But the potential value of the submarine as an ASW platform remained, and
SubDevGru 2 retained its mission of fulfilling this promise.
The second axis of submarine development focused on the search for new power plant
technologies that would enable the true submarine—one that was completely inde-
pendent from the surface. The desire for a true submarine grew at least partly out of
the submarine force’s reaction to what had occurred during the Second Battle in the
Atlantic. There, the Allies had marshaled ASW forces far in excess of both the numbers
and the capabilities the Japanese had deployed during the war in the Pacific. Likewise,
in response, the Germans had developed new technologies which resulted in subma-
rines far superior to all those that had preceded them, primarily by approaching closer
to the ideal of the true submarine. This included both the Type XXI and the more ex-
otic Type XXVI Walther boat, which introduced the first truly air-independent propul-
sion (AIP) plant using hydrogen peroxide as an oxidizer. The U.S. submarine force was
therefore quite interested in giving its own forces capabilities like these, even though
their purpose was not always clear, except as a target against which friendly ASW forces
could exercise. At any rate, one key to a true submarine was AIP, and the submarine
force experimented with both Walther plants and, more importantly, nuclear power.
The second key was a hull form designed for high-speed, submerged operation in three
dimensions, rather than surfaced or near-surface operations in two.
Nuclear power was rapidly chosen as the optimum propulsion plant for a true subma-
rine, and its first deployment on Nautilus helped spur a new phase of the Third Battle.
But nuclear power did not begin life as an ideal power plant for an ASW submarine.
Certainly, Nautilus was much louder than an SSK on its battery under all circum-
stances, and this asymmetry appeared at least initially to be inherent to the technology,
given the need for reactor coolant pumps and other such machinery to be kept running
at all times. Here, for example, is Project Nobska’s view of this question in December 1956:
The reactor art is also likely to continue to move ahead rapidly, but it should be emphasized that until
nuclear plants can be made quiet, they are not necessarily the optimum propulsion system for the true
submarine. Any system of reasonable endurance that does not require air and that is really quiet could
be a strong competitor.32
Or later in the same report, with specific reference to the ASW mission:
Since the submarine is an excellent mobile sonar platform, maximum advantage should be taken of it
as an ASW vehicle. We feel that the effectiveness of the submarine in this mission will be limited
largely by the noise which it produces. Therefore, our first suggested pre-prototype is a submarine in
which quietness of operation is made an over-riding consideration. As a point of departure this might
be considered as a pre-prototype embodying size, speed, and equipment suitable for an SSK mission.33
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As with the earlier SSKs, another emphasis beyond quieting was on cost and ease of
production in order to achieve sufficient numbers in peacetime, and nuclear power
complicated that objective as well.
The point in these examples is that nuclear power began as a means of achieving the
true submarine, a basic technological objective that transcended the requirements of
any particular mission and which almost constituted an end in itself. Ironically, given
what lay in the future, the fit between nuclear power and ASW was not a natural one.
More advanced underwater hull forms were the subject of the Albacore experiment, an
FY 50 initiative designed to look at the control problems that would arise if submarines
adopted hydrodynamically efficient, single-body-of-revolution hulls. So-called tear-
drop hulls with single screws were clearly the way toward maximum submerged speed,
but designers had no way of knowing how to control them. Albacore was an experi-
ment designed to answer this question and to determine whether teardrop hulls could
be adopted for submarines with AIP plants—whether nuclear or closed cycle. Albacore
was also the first U.S. submarine to use high yield (HY80) steel in her hull.
The third axis of submarine development during the first years of the Third Battle was
less ambitious technically than the previous two, and sought simply to integrate Type
XXI technology into a multipurpose diesel submarine that would constitute the near
term backbone of the U.S. submarine force. The main challenge here was budgets. Even
after Korea, the submarine force did not immediately benefit from the resulting surge
in defense spending, as was demonstrated by the relatively small building program for
new diesel attack boats begun in the first decade of the Third Battle. Only ten new
diesel attack boats were purchased by the U.S. Navy through fiscal year 1956, six Tangs,
one Darter, and three Barbels. The Tang class was an explicit attempt to improve on the
Type XXI, and they were funded with high priority in FY48–49 with the support of the
rest of the Navy, due to the need for modern ASW targets.
The main element of the force structure consisted of conversions. The GUPPY (greater
underwater propulsion power) was an extensive conversion that gave fleet boats a snor-
kel, a more streamlined hull, much greater battery capacity, and a BQR-2. There were a
total of fifty GUPPY conversions made between 1946 and 1960. The GUPPY SSKs were
the best that the submarine force could do and still maintain a reasonable force struc-
ture. As late as 1965, there were still forty-eight SSKs in the force structure compared to
twenty-four SSNs.34 Compared to the BQR-4 SSK conversions, the GUPPYs traded
some long-range detection capability for a greater probability of closing and attacking
the targets they did detect, due to their greater underwater speed and endurance.35
The SSKs can be considered the submarine force’s response to the Soviet Type XXI
threat, designed as they were to counter a snorkeling sub on a long-range transit. As
2 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
such, they constituted a major innovation in their own right. But the main point of de-
scribing diesel boat development in the submarine force is to establish a baseline to
compare developments before and after the two nuclear revolutions. After 1955, there
was an explosion of development in the submarine force, leading to the combination
of the ASW submarine, the true submarine, and the multipurpose submarine into one
dominant platform, the quiet, multipurpose SSN. During the same period, albeit as a
result of pressure from outside the submarine force, Polaris ballistic missiles were de-
veloped for deployment on SSBNs based on modified SSN designs. Finally, with the fo-
cus on SSNs and SSBNs, the submarine force dropped its experimentation with other
missions, including using the submarine as a radar picket for carrier battle groups and
as launchers for the already developed Regulus cruise missile, which, in addition to sev-
eral SSRs and SSGs, resulted in only one SSRN and one SSGN ever being deployed,
USS Triton and USS Halibut.36 Because of the national priority behind the Polaris pro-
gram, nuclear submarine production initially focused on SSBNs, but a class of quiet,
multipurpose SSNs still began deployment in 1960.
The initially independent steps toward this grand synthesis were the Tang (SS), the Al-
bacore, the Nautilus, and the three SSKs, all of which were funded by FY52, before
Korea, in a time of great budgetary scarcity. Seawolf was funded a year after Nautilus in
FY53 as the platform to test a liquid metal-cooled reactor, which promised higher
power densities than pressurized water. No submarines were authorized in FY54, and
then four Skates (SSN) were authorized in FY55–56. The Skate class was a modest evo-
lution on the basic Nautilus design. FY56 also saw three Barbels (SS) authorized. The
Barbels combined the multipurpose orientation of the Tang with the first operational
use of the Albacore teardrop hull form. In September 1955, after Nautilus’s initial exer-
cises, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke declared that all further Amer-
ican submarines would be nuclear submarines, and the FY57 program contained five
SSNs. These became the Skipjacks which first combined the Albacore hull with nuclear
power and are reputed to be the first submarines to exceed 30 knots. In FY58, the USS
Tullibee (SSKN) was funded along with three other SSNs, which originally were to be
modified Skipjacks but which eventually became the all new Thresher class.
Tullibee combined the ASW focus of the SSKs with the smallest nuclear reactor then
feasible, with an eye toward a relatively cheap, dedicated ASW asset that could be de-
ployed in the numbers still considered necessary to fully populate the forward barriers.
Compared to the 15,000 SHP S5W type reactor of a Skipjack, Tullibee had a 2,500 SHP
reactor and turbo-electric drive.37 She could barely make 20 knots, but she lacked the
reduction gears whose loud tonals made prior SSNs so easy for SOSUS to detect at ex-
treme range. She also continued the tradition established by the BQR-4 equipped SSKs
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by mounting a large, bow-mounted, passive, low-frequency array, the BQR-7. On
Tullibee, the BQR-7 was wrapped around the first spherical active sonar, the BQS-6,
and together they formed the first integrated sonar system, the BQQ-1. As an ASW
platform, her performance was unmatched, but almost as soon as the decision to de-
ploy Tullibee was made, a further decision was made to avoid specialized platforms and
pursue instead a multipurpose SSN that best combined the speed of Skipjack and the
ASW capability of Tullibee into one platform. This became the USS Thresher.
All subsequent U.S. submarine classes derive from the Thresher class, sometimes re-
ferred to as the Permit class after the lead ship was lost in 1963. Both Tullibee and the
Threshers were also the first submarines designed explicitly for ASW against nuclear
submarines. The key was quieting. Tullibee represented an attempt to eliminate the
sources of noise in the submarine, while Thresher represented an effort to insulate that
noise from the hull and the water beyond. The basic solution adopted in the latter case
was rafting, whereby the engineering plant of the submarine, containing all or most of
its rotating machinery, was placed on a flexible mount or raft within the submarine.
This dramatically reduced the amplitude of the mechanical vibrations coupling to the
hull, and therefore the sound that was put into the water. It also drove up the size of
the hull and, as a consequence, propelled by the same S5W as the Skipjack, Thresher
lost a few knots of top end speed. Rafting and other quieting technologies also drove
up the cost of the submarine, partly due to the increase in size, but also due to the
fiendish engineering problems associated with requirements like circulating water at
great pressure from outside the hull into the ship through flexible piping.
The benefit was a dramatic acoustic advantage over the prior Skipjacks and the Skates,
and more to the point, the Soviet HENS—the Hotels (SSBN), Echos (SSGN), and
Novembers (SSN) which began deploying alongside the Threshers in the early 1960s.
Furthermore, this was a broadband acoustic advantage, which is to say that LOFAR re-
mained a non-standard element of the U.S. submarine fleet’s sonar suites until much
later in the 1960s.38 With the BQQ-1, which was designed in 1958, initial detections at
the convergence zones were possible either with the BQR-7 using low frequency broad-
band starting at 150 Hz, or with the BQS-6. The higher frequency BQS-6 would then
track the target through bottom bounce range into direct path, where a fire control so-
lution could be made.
Torpedoes were the big remaining question mark in submarine versus submarine ASW
for the U.S. submarine force. When the threat had been a snorkeling diesel, the ASW
torpedo problem was not severe in that it was slow and two dimensional, akin to at-
tacking a very loud surface ship moving at 8–12 knots. Thus, the first submarine-
launched, passive homing torpedo, the 16-knot Mk. 27-4, deployed in 1949, was
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effective in exercises both against snorkelers and fully submerged subs on battery as
long as they did not exceed 10 knots.39 In 1956, the 26-knot Mk. 37 followed. In gen-
eral, a torpedo needs to be 1.5 times faster than its prey to assure that the latter will not
have the ability to outrun it under some circumstances, which means that Whiskeys and
Zulus surprised by a Mk. 27 while snorkeling would have been fair game and would have
been vulnerable to a Mk. 37 under all circumstances. A 25–30 knot nuclear submarine
was a different proposition. It would ideally require a high speed homing torpedo capa-
ble of 45 knots, something which was not provided until the Mk. 48’s deployment in
1972. In the interim, two alternatives were pursued, one tactical and one technical.
The technical solution was to use nuclear torpedoes (Mk. 45) and later rocket-propelled
nuclear depth charges (SUBROC). This was one of the major recommendations of the
1956 Nobska report, but it was never the optimal solution for the Navy, which pre-
ferred a conventional solution. This led to the tactical solution, which was to use the
formidable acoustic advantage to obtain firing positions for the Mk. 37, whose geome-
try both minimized the chances of detection of the torpedo launch by the target, and
the chances that the target could escape, even if it did detect the torpedo in the water.
Innovations in Air ASW
The VP community was a close second behind the submarine force in embracing the
passive acoustic approach to ASW. Unlike the submarine force, the VP community was
a major member of the ASW team that fought the Second Battle. After the war, it was
part of the traditional response to the Type XXI threat mounted by that team. Thus, for
the first five years after the war, the VP community continued its focus on the concept
of operations in which SIGINT cueing was used to vector radar-equipped aircraft to
surfaced or snorkeling submarines, where they would be attacked by acoustic homing
torpedoes derived from the World War II Mk. 24. The main challenge to this approach
posed by the Type XXI was its snorkel, which reduced radar detection ranges, so the
major technical effort mounted by the air ASW community during this period was the
large APS-20 radar, which by 1950 had recovered much of the detection range origi-
nally lost to the snorkel, but was not too big to be carried by long-range VP aircraft.
The embrace of passive acoustics by the VP community grew in stages and is largely a
story of sonobuoy development. The first attempt to use sonobuoys came early in
World War II and saw them as a ship-launched device to warn of U-boats closing a
convoy from the rear. Developed by RCA (Radio Corporation of America) at the direc-
tion of the National Defense Research Council (NDRC), they were not adopted, but the
technology was then used to solve another problem, the high false alarm rate experi-
enced by blimps used in coastal ASW patrols using MADs as their primary search sen-
sor. Again, sonobuoys were never actually adopted for this purpose, but were then used
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by the Army in experiments where they were dropped by aircraft into the wakes of re-
cently submerged submarines. These experiments were successful enough to cause the
Army Air Forces to order 6,410 sonobuoys in 1942. These became the AN/CRT-1, and
this interest by the Army caused the Navy to reconsider its position on sonobuoys, and
by 1944 the Navy had ordered 59,700 of them.
After the war, sonobuoy development was largely put on the shelf with the exception of
the omnidirectional SSQ-2, which first deployed in 1950, but which suffered through
serious reliability problems for several years. In the years when the submarine force
was first experimenting with SSKs carrying large, bow-mounted, low-frequency arrays,
the potential role of passive acoustics in VP operations was less clear. Omnidirectional
buoys like the SSQ-2 could detect targets at reasonable range but without the bearing
resolution necessary for localization and attack, and the development of directional
buoys had proven quite problematic. Thus, sonobuoys remained useful as a tool for classifi-
cation, but were not yet ready to replace radar as the primary air ASW search sensor.
This began to change with the development of SOSUS, for several reasons. SOSUS and
the low-frequency detection and signal-processing advances associated with it led both
to a demand for better air ASW capabilities and the means to achieve them. The de-
mand was for a means of quickly prosecuting a SOSUS detection before the contact
grew stale, and the solution was to give VP aircraft the ability to search SOSUS proba-
bility areas and localize submarines within them using passive acoustics. The first an-
swer to this tactical challenge was Jezebel/Codar/Julie, which were different signal
processing techniques used with the same low-frequency sonobuoys for search and lo-
calization respectively. The first LF sonobuoy was the omnidirectional SSQ-23 de-
ployed in 1957. Jezebel applied LOFAR processing to the output of an SSQ-23, which
suddenly gave buoys extraordinary initial detection ranges, albeit with little or no bear-
ing or range resolution. Codar was a means of passive localization of the LOFAR con-
tact, while Julie was active.
Codar used two precisely spaced SSQ-23s to detect and correlate broadband LF signals
using the time difference of arrival method. When successful, the first Codar pair gave
an ambiguous bearing, and at least one other pair of buoys was necessary to resolve the
bearing ambiguity. Julie used explosive sound sources called practice depth charges
(PDCs). After planting an array of SSQ-23s, the aircraft would “bomb” each buoy with a
PDC until it received an echo return. After localization using either or both methods, the
aircraft would seek MAD contact as the final step before release of a homing torpedo.
The weak link in this chain was localization. As a broadband system, Codar lacked
Jezebel’s range and often failed to detect the target that Jezebel had initially acquired.
Even when it did, it took time for the four buoys to be placed, and against diesels, this
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time often exceeded the snorkel period. Once the target was on battery, Codar became
much less effective and the target would often be lost. As an active system, Julie was
equally effective against snorkelers and subs on battery, but it had even less range than
Codar, which made Julie localizations of Jezebel detections equally difficult.
Jezebel, Codar, and Julie demanded great skill of their operators, and normal personnel
rotation policies therefore made it difficult for the average crew to gain and retain these
skills. This was one of the impetuses behind the establishment of Task Force Delta in
1961, which sought to do for the VP/SOSUS ASW team what Project Kayo and
SubDevGru 2 had done for submarine versus submarine ASW. Select crews in TF Delta
would be immersed in the challenge of coordinating VP operations with SOSUS and
mastering Jezebel/Codar/Julie. They would then be spread amongst the various fleet
VP squadrons. TF Delta would also experiment with new tactics and new technologies.
Jezebel/Codar/Julie was useful in other air ASW missions as well, and it played a role
both in the VP-SSK forward barriers as well as in coordinated air-surface,
Hunter-Killer (HUK) group operations. Thus, carrier-based VS squadrons flying the
S-2 also adopted these techniques.
The deployment of the Thresher and the establishment of Task Force Delta in 1961
were the culmination of a decade of experimentation and development of passive
acoustic ASW methods. At the same time, the evolution of the more traditional radar
and active sonar-based methods used during the Second Battle continued. This line of
development was centered in the destroyer and carrier-based air ASW communities,
commonly organized for ASW purposes into a Hunter-Killer (HUK) group consisting
of an aircraft carrier, its air wing, and a destroyer squadron.
The Evolution of Traditional ASW Methods
HUK groups had first been used in World War II, both as a means of closing the North
Atlantic air gap and as a means of attacking U-boat concentrations revealed by Ultra
decryptions and HF/DF. Special escort carriers (CVEs) were developed to support
these groups, whose air wings consisted of naval attack aircraft converted to the ASW
role. After the war, the Navy retained HUK groups in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Their operational focus lay in three distinct ASW tasks: offensive area search based on
offboard cueing, screening for carrier battle groups or amphibious task forces, and
convoy escort. In 1958, the Navy took the additional step of permanently assigning one
HUK group the task of accelerating tactical development and increasing readiness in
each of these three ASW mission areas. These groups were named Task Force Alfa,
Bravo, and Charlie respectively.
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There are three strands to the story of the World War II ASW team which continued
from the first phase of the Third Battle into the second one. The first two involve the
evolution of the two platform communities, air and surface, while the third involves
the evolution of their operation together as a team in the HUKs.
The evolution of the carrier-based, fixed-wing air ASW community (VS) during the
first two phases of the Third Battle is the shortest story, because it merges beginning in
the late 1950s with the developments in the VP community described in the previous
section. Prior to that point, the developments unique to the VS community had been
dominated by the pursuit of a better snorkel detection radar. This search was compli-
cated by the need to mate that radar with an aircraft compatible with the relatively
small and slow World War II ASW carriers.
The first solution to this tradeoff was the AF-2W (with radar) and the AF-2S (with
weapons) hunter-killer team in which the hunter aircraft carried an APS-20, while the
killer carried everything else, including a smaller radar, ECM, sonobuoys, and torpe-
does. The team tactics generated by this pairing could be effective but demanded high
crew skills and became difficult under many weather conditions, particularly for the
killer aircraft. A presentation at the May 1952 undersea warfare symposium describes
these tactics:
(1) The search plane obtains radar contact (2) It gives the attack plane a vector (3) The attack plane
steers the heading (4) It descends to attack altitude of about 300 feet (5) Attack radar is energized
when target is at 5 or 6 miles (6) Circuits energized for weapon release—bomb bay doors open (7)
Sonobuoy circuit energized (8) At one mile, searchlight on—pilot still flying on instruments at 300
feet (9) Target detected by searchlight operator/bombardier (10) Target identified (11) Torpedo away
(12) Pilot drops buoys and sea markers over submarine position—listens for explosion/cavitation
sounds (13) Wire recorder turned on to record sounds (14) Pilot completes sonobuoy pattern in case
it becomes necessary to track submerged submarine.40
Though the team approach had advantages, including the fact that it allowed a more
effective search radar, the disadvantages in terms of cost, all-weather capability, and de-
pendence on radio led to a “single package” aircraft, the S-2F.
The S-2F was the first purpose-designed VS aircraft. It had a crew of four, an APS-33
X-band radar, and a smaller but similar payload as compared to its VP contemporary,
the P-2V. It sacrificed some snorkel detection capability in higher sea states for the ad-
vantages described above. In addition, since the APS-20 was also used by air defense
early warning aircraft, which a larger CVS would also normally deploy, the single pack-
age aircraft might still benefit from APS-20 cueing.
The APS-20 versus “single package” debate was rendered somewhat moot by the devel-
opment in the mid-1950s of Jezebel/Julie, which promised a strong complement to the
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radar for search. Thus, S-2Fs began adopting Jezebel/Julie alongside the VP commu-
nity, and the sensor/weapon development paths of those two communities began to
merge by the end of the 1950s.
The air ASW picture described above was far from sufficient to address even the Type
XXI threat by itself much less the nuclear threat. At every stage of the generic air ASW
engagement described above, the submarine might take countermeasures that would
be effective in ending the engagement, or at least in forcing its repetition over many it-
erations. At the very outset, a submarine’s ECM receiver was likely to detect the APS-20
at least one and a half times the range that the latter was likely to detect the subma-
rine’s snorkel. Given such warning, it would submerge, and the engagement would be
returned to the search phase. In general, at any point in the engagement right up until
just before weapon release, the submarine could submerge and usually get away. This
was due to the almost complete inability of the air ASW community to detect a fully
submerged submarine on battery. This was a tactical situation that demanded an active
sonar, but fixed-wing ASW aircraft were not effective active ASW platforms, and even
with Jezebel/Codar/Julie, which could detect a nuclear submarine, the tactical problem
of the very quiet battery boat remained unsolved.
This is the all-important role that the destroyer (DD) community had played during
the latter years of World War II and would continue to play most prominently as the
other half of the HUKs, which each contained a destroyer squadron as well as a CVS.
The key to this air-surface team approach was that a properly designed destroyer would
be able to hold and track a submerged submarine on battery with its active sonar if it
could be brought within the detection range of that sonar. Thus, the tactic that evolved
was for the VS community to respond to all radar or ECM contacts and attempt at a
minimum to classify them and, if they were submarines, stop them from snorkeling.
This limited the submarine’s rate of advance and kept it from fully recharging its bat-
tery. Most important though were two other results of such a classification. It would al-
low the protected asset, a carrier battle group for example, to take evasive action, and it
would also constitute a datum toward which destroyers might converge. Over time, af-
ter several snorkel periods in succession in which such a datum was refreshed from the
air, a track would develop and sufficient time would pass for the destroyers to close the
target, at which point it might be attacked immediately or held down and trailed con-
tinuously until its battery was exhausted.
The other role for destroyers was to form active sonar screens around task forces or
convoys. These inner screens relied on active sonar because passive sonar would be
swamped by all the noise generated near a group of surface ships, and because the
screen had to move at the speed of advance of the protected asset, which in the case of
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a carrier would usually be above 20 knots, exceeding the tactical speed of any passive so-
nar platform. In both roles, the destroyer would benefit from longer range active sonar
and, as with the submarine force, this drove the surface community toward larger, low-
frequency arrays, but it proved more difficult for the surface force to get long-range active
sonar than it was for the submarine force to get long-range passive sonar.
As with radar, active sonar depends on receiving an echo from the target, which means
that the signal travels twice as far as with a passive system, which in turn means that
there are greater propagation losses and therefore inherently shorter detection ranges
for any active system compared to a passive system, all other things being equal. Fur-
thermore, all other things were not equal, and the DD community faced four other ob-
stacles in its quest for better sonar.
First, destroyers operated above the isothermal surface layer, and much of the energy
from their active sonar remained trapped in that layer where propagation losses were
high and detection ranges were limited to the direct path. Second, the hull-mounted
active sonar arrays were exposed both to the turbulent flow of the hull and to machin-
ery noise within the hull. Third, and perhaps most important, low-frequency, active
sonar arrays were large enough and required enough power that they established a
lower bound on the size of the ship that could carry them. For example, World War II
fleet boats could be converted into SSKs with a convergence zone detection capability
with the addition of a passive BQR-2 array, but as it would turn out, World War II de-
stroyers could not be given an active sonar with a convergence zone range because the
first system with that capability, the SQS-26, was too large.
Four generations of active sonar were developed for the DD community between the
late 1940s and 1960. The QHB was the first scanning sonar, operating at 25 kHz using a
19-inch diameter transducer and giving a range of about 1,800 yards at 20 knots in
1950.41 By 1959, the SQS-4 operating at 15 kHz needed an array 4 to 5 feet in diameter,
but was achieving maximum detection ranges of 8,000 yards. The SQS-23, first de-
ployed in 1958 and operating at 5 kHz, required a transducer 8 feet in diameter. The
expected payoff for such a large array was direct path detection ranges of no more than
10,000 yards and the possibility of bottom bounce detections that would finally elimi-
nate the constraint of operating within the surface layer.
The SQS-23 encountered serious problems during its first decade in operational use
and was never able to reliably achieve bottom bounce detection ranges, though it did
extend direct path ranges out to the point where the destroyer once again became
weapon limited rather than sensor limited in a tactical engagement against a sub-
merged diesel on battery.42 The SQS-23 was also too large to be fitted to all but the larg-
est fleet destroyers of World War II, and the anticipated follow-on to the SQS-23, the
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3.5 kHz SQS-26, made matters even worse with an even larger transducer and greater
power requirements. This demonstrated that new construction was going to be neces-
sary to create an adequate surface ASW platform. Starting in 1960, seventy-five SQS-26
ships were authorized of the Bronstein (2), Brooke (10), Garcia (10), and Knox (46)
classes, as well as eleven cruisers, including the nine Belknaps, but the SQS-26 also ex-
perienced problems similar to the SQS-23 and was not fully accepted for service use by
the Navy until 1968.43
Limited through the 1960s to the direct path detection ranges of the SQS-23 and the
SQS-26 before its bugs were worked out, the destroyer community still had trouble de-
veloping weapons and fire control systems that could track and attack high speed con-
tacts at the ranges that SQS-23/26 detected them. ASROC and DASH were alternative
solutions to this problem. ASROC was a rocket that carried either a nuclear depth
charge or a homing torpedo, while DASH was a small, unmanned helicopter. ASROC
proved more reliable in operational use than DASH, but was limited to direct path
ranges and would not be adequate when bottom-bounce (BB) and convergence-zone
(CZ) sonars became available. DASH was designed with an eye toward these latter ca-
pabilities, but when they finally became available in the late 1960s, a manned helicopter
proved a more reliable solution. Backing up ASROC and DASH, destroyers also de-
ployed launchers for homing torpedoes to be used only at very close range in
self-defense.
In order to achieve the minimum numbers believed necessary for its surface ASW
force, the Navy chose in 1958 to modernize existing World War II destroyers by giving
them the maximum ASW suite that would fit in their hulls. Known as the Fleet Reha-
bilitation and Modernization (FRAM) program, FRAM I saw seventy-nine Gearing
class DDs given SQS-23, ASROC/DASH, and Mk. 111 digital fire control, while FRAM
II saw fifty-two Sumner/Fletchers given a more austere suite including SQS-4, DASH,
and an SQS-9 variable depth sonar (VDS).
This represented an evolutionary development path focused on an active acoustic ap-
proach to the ASW problem. This path began when the threat was a Type XXI. Against
that threat, the active acoustic approach complemented other techniques. For example,
active acoustics was not the best way to detect snorkelers, but it was the only way to de-
tect a Type XXI once it was on battery. This was the rationale behind the hold-down
tactics pursued by the HUK groups, where aircraft detected snorkelers and surface
ships held them down once they had submerged and tracked them until they exhausted
their batteries. But hold-down tactics based on active sonar did not work against
nuclear submarines. Because of their speed in all three dimensions and their underwa-
ter endurance, nuclear submarines could usually either outrun a surface ship if they
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wanted to escape or outmaneuver its active sonar beam if it wanted to attack it or the
platform it was screening.
This produced a great paradox in the development of U.S. ASW capabilities at the end
of the second phase of the Third Battle. Passive acoustics became the key to dealing
with almost all aspects of ASW against nuclear submarines; ASW against nuclear sub-
marines, including especially nuclear missile submarines, was a mission whose diffi-
culty and national importance justified the great expenditures on ASW that began in
the 1950s. Active acoustics in this realm remained important as the last of several barri-
ers that the nuclear submarine had to penetrate in order to attack high value surface
targets, but was much less useful against nuclear submarines in open ocean search and
forward barrier operations.
By contrast, active acoustics never ceased to play a large role in ASW against diesel-
electric submarines, but the rise of the nuclear submarine eclipsed the threat posed by
the Type XXI and its successors. The U.S. Navy focused on the high-end nuclear sub-
marine threat, while its allies tended to focus on the diesel sub threat. Thus, as the U.S.
Navy’s ASW posture was optimized after 1960 for the nuclear submarine threat, re-
sources flowed toward the platforms most suited to adopting the passive acoustic ap-
proach that had been chosen to counter it.
For surface ships, there were many obstacles in the path of exploiting passive acoustics,
prime among them being the need for more quiet ships, both to increase their sensitiv-
ity as listening platforms and to decrease the prospect of counter-detection, and the
need to find a way of putting a large listening array below the surface layer. As we shall
see in the next section, it would not be until the late 1970s that the surface community
would begin to take these steps, though attempts were made to do this sooner, the
abortive, mid-1960s Project Sea Hawk being the main example. The result was that the
destroyer community retained its exclusive focus on active acoustics during the period
when the submarine and air communities were embracing passive acoustics.
American ASW and the First Soviet Nuclear Submarines
As ASW developments in the intelligence (SOSUS), submarine, air, and surface com-
munities became focused to varying degrees during the 1950s on the threat of nuclear
submarines, and particularly nuclear missile submarines, Soviet nuclear submarine
development lagged behind American expectations, though not as much as it had in the
years between World War II and Korea, when a large Soviet Type XXI force was the threat.
The first Soviet nuclear submarine was the November SSN, launched in 1958. Using
basically the same propulsion system, Hotel SSBNs and Echo SSGNs were deployed
soon after. Together, these were known in the West as the HENs, and between 1958 and
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1968, a total of 55 were deployed, 13 Novembers, 8 Hotels, and 34 Echos. They all had
two reactors, two fast-turning screws, and a double hull.
From an ASW perspective, the HENs were contemporaries of Nautilus and the Skates,
which is to say that they could defeat traditional ASW measures based on radar and ac-
tive sonar, but were extremely vulnerable to the new passive acoustic approach already
being adopted by the U.S. Navy. At speed, their double hulls generated considerable
flow noise and their two fast-turning screws cavitated loudly. Alongside this broadband
signature was a pronounced LOFAR signature useful for both long-range detection and
classification.
LOFAR detection ranges against both American and Soviet first generation nuclear
submarines were astounding. For example, SSBN 598, USS George Washington, which
was actually a lengthened Skipjack, on one of her first deterrent patrols in 1961, was
tracked continuously across the Atlantic all the way to the United Kingdom by SOSUS
arrays deployed along the East Coast of the United States. In July 1962, a SOSUS array
off Barbados detected a Soviet HEN class submarine as it crossed the Greenland-Ice-
land-UK gap, the first detection of a Soviet nuclear submarine by SOSUS.44 In both
cases, SOSUS was able to exploit the fact that both propellers and rotating machinery
mounted directly to a submarine’s hull generated clear, predictable narrowband tonals
at source levels high enough for large LOFAR arrays to detect and track them on an
ocean-wide basis.
These surveillance capabilities were complemented by the new tactical ASW prosecu-
tion capabilities of the VP and submarine communities. In the VP community, in
which LOFAR was first introduced during 1956–1957, there were initially troublesome
tactical problems generated by the extreme detection ranges possible with
omnidirectional LOFAR sonobuoys when they were first used against snorkeling sub-
marines. Here is a description of some of those problems by Russ Mason, a key mem-
ber of the technical community responsible for sonobuoy development:
(LOFAR) turned out to be so good under certain conditions in certain areas that it caused airborne
ASW a major problem. Instead of detecting submarines only a few thousand yards away, Jezebel was
consistently making detections in the tens or even occasionally hundreds of miles. The sensitivity of
the system was not really recognized, known, or believed for years. . . . A LOFAR detection could not
necessarily, as planned or hoped for, be turned into a CODAR bearing and fix because CODAR, being
broadband, did not approach the sensitivity of narrowband Jezebel ranges.45
This was a particular problem against diesel electric boats, which became vulnerable to
LOFAR only when they snorkeled, which put an upper bound on the time the ASW
aircraft had to accomplish a CODAR localization before the target went back on bat-
tery. But against nuclear submarines, whose LOFAR signatures were essentially
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continuous, the problems associated with localizing long-range Jezebel contacts eased
considerably because they were no longer intermittent.
In the submarine community, and particularly with quiet, second generation subs like
Tullibee and the Threshers, because of the wide apertures of their low-frequency ar-
rays, it was possible to get long-range detection of the broadband signature of first gen-
eration nuclear submarines like Nautilus or, more importantly, the Soviet HENs. The
following is a now-declassified, contemporary description of this capability as it was
first emerging:
The past year (7/60-6/61) has seen the introduction and the commencement of the evaluation of
Tullibee (SSN-597) as a vehicle constructed specifically for anti-submarine warfare. Installed equip-
ment and characteristics of this ship represent the most impressive advance in submarine ASW capa-
bility to date. Passive detection to over 100 miles and active ranging to the first convergence zone
coupled with extremely low self and propagation noise bring us to a new era of submarine participa-
tion in the antisubmarine effort. These improvements are also characteristic of Thresher (SSN-593)
and the follow-on ships of her class.46
Unlike in the VP community, LOFAR was first used in the submarine force only as a
classification tool because broadband sonar was sufficient for long-range detection and
easier to use tactically.
To conclude discussion of the second phase of the Third Battle in the period between
1950 and 1960, two points stand out. First, as with the first phase of the Third Battle
against the Type XXI, the U.S. Navy ended up nearly preempting the ASW challenge
posed by the Soviet submarine force’s anticipated exploitation of the two nuclear revo-
lutions. In other words, by the time the HENs actually began going to sea, all the ele-
ments of an effective ASW response to them had already been demonstrated and were
being deployed by the U.S. Navy. Second, once implemented, this ASW response was
clearly going to necessitate a dramatic shift in the resources available to and the status
of the Navy’s different platform communities, and yet the specific programs that would
cause this shift were not suppressed by those with the most to lose. Thus, the Navy con-
tinued to keep pace at the technical and tactical levels with the peacetime evolution of
the Soviet submarine threat, even as that threat began to grow in a qualitative sense by
leaps and bounds. The Navy was able to do this at least in part through the kind of
technical and doctrinal innovation which is normally considered rare in military orga-
nizations in peacetime.
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Phase III of the Third Battle
ASW and the Happy Time, 1960–1980
SOSUS, the quiet, ASW-optimized SSN, and Jezebel/Codar/Julie for VP and VS aircraft
were all developed by the end of the 1950s. These were the key elements of a new ap-
proach to ASW emphasizing passive acoustics, and it was this approach which became
central in the ASW battle against Soviet nuclear submarines. But to be fully exploited,
these new tools needed to be integrated into a combined arms team that still included
more traditional tools. Furthermore, once a new concept of operations was established,
sufficient numbers of platforms needed to be deployed to support it in peacetime.
Thus, where the 1950s was a period of radical technological ferment in the ASW mis-
sion area, the 1960s saw a series of doctrinal debates over how best to exploit the tech-
nological bonanza that resulted. As always, the chief protagonists in these debates
tended to be the individual ASW platform communities.
The Barrier Strategy Embraced
The core of the new concept of operation was to place barriers between Soviet
homeports and open-ocean patrol areas wherever maritime geography made them pos-
sible. Barriers were feasible in deep water wherever SOSUS arrays could be emplaced in
such a way as to cover a choke point, and given SOSUS’ range, these choke points could
be quite wide. For example, the waters separating Greenland, Iceland, and the United
Kingdom (GIUK) became a key choke point, and the 1965 decision to emplace SOSUS
arrays and create a barrier there was part of a general strategy that sought to push
SOSUS barriers as far forward as possible. NavFac Keflavik was established in 1966, and
by 1974 a total of twenty-two SOSUS installations existed along the East and West
coasts of the United States and at various forward choke points.47 Another key expan-
sion of the SOSUS network came with the establishment in 1964 of an array off
Andoya, covering the entrance to the Norwegian Sea between Norway, Bear Island, and
Spitsbergen.48 By 1981, unclassified depictions of SOSUS described it as having thirty-
six installations, including facilities located in the United States, the United Kingdom,
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Turkey, Japan, the Aleutians, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, Barbados, Canada, Nor-
way, Iceland, the Azores, Italy, Denmark, Gibraltar, the Ryukyus, Panama, the Philip-
pines, Guam, and Diego Garcia.49
Within such a choke point or barrier, submarines and/or VP could be cued by
long-range SOSUS detections. In the earlier sub-air barriers, submarines spaced at
twice the average range of their bow sonar provided the initial detections. This pro-
duced requirements for more submarines than could be afforded in peacetime, hence
the interest in experimental designs like K-1 and, later, Tullibee, which could hopefully
be produced in numbers large enough to man these barriers. Furthermore, even with
the peacetime submarine force that could be afforded, forward barriers could not be
maintained in peacetime because of the normal requirements for training, upkeep, and
crew rotation. Therefore, warning was needed in advance to create a barrier, and the
degree of warning received determined how far forward these barriers could be estab-
lished. But this had always implied a certain circularity of logic, because forward barriers
were one of the primary means of confirming a large Soviet submarine deployment. For
example, five Soviet submarines deployed from the Kola peninsula area in early Octo-
ber to support Soviet naval operations in late October 1962, in the Caribbean during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. They were not detected until they encountered American
quarantine forces in the region; therefore, the sub-air barrier off Argentia that was es-
tablished after the quarantine began missed them.50
SOSUS directly addressed both of these problems. Because SOSUS made the initial de-
tections, barriers now needed to be manned by platforms sufficient only to prosecute
contacts, which was a much smaller number than that required to make the initial de-
tections. Furthermore, SOSUS was a permanent peacetime installation that could and
was in fact designed to provide advance warning of Soviet submarine movements.
Thus, far forward arrays might give warning sufficient for barriers further back to be
manned in time to interdict a deployment. For SOSUS-VP barriers, basing rights in the
region would allow permanent detachments of air ASW aircraft to man barriers in
peacetime.
The new concept of operations also envisioned independent, far forward operations by
SSNs. In peacetime, these would provide intelligence and warning, and in wartime
would constitute the first barrier that Soviet submarines would encounter when they
left their bases. Even within the deep-water SOSUS barriers further back, SSNs would
operate largely independent of VP forces. Sub-air tactics had always been hampered by
communication and IFF problems. Because SOSUS eliminated the need for close coop-
eration between the two communities, both were happy to go off on their own. Thus,
main barriers like the GIUK consisted of alternating layers in which VP and submarines
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conducted the prosecutions. In the forward areas, submarines operated alone, and in
the rear areas, along friendly coastlines, VP dominated and submarines were largely ab-
sent. These independent operations contrasted with the cooperative tactics that were
central to the effectiveness of a HUK group’s air-DD team.
The big doctrinal question created by the new barrier concept revolved around what
was needed, if anything, in addition to the barriers. One view was that ASW strategy
had fundamentally changed in such a way as to make those additional requirements
much smaller than in the past:
Advanced nuclear attack submarines in barriers could exact considerable attrition as Soviet sub-
marines surged into the North Atlantic shipping lanes, and as they attempted to return to their bases
for replenishment. The evolving SOSUS network could direct long-range ASW aircraft and destroyer-
carrier-hunter-killer (HUK) forces against submarines at sea in the North Atlantic; as shore-based air-
craft performance improved, even the HUK units became less important. . . . Thus, the balance of the ASW
effort would shift from escort operations to offensive patrol, with escort ships employed as a backup.51
In some eyes, this was fortunate, because, as the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, Rear Ad-
miral R. K. James, argued in 1961:
. . . the time has come when we should seriously question the wisdom of continuing to emphasize the
surface ship as our primary ASW vehicle. . . . [W]e are trying to accomplish the job the hard way, ex-
pending tremendous effort to get our sonars deep in the water where the acoustic problems will disap-
pear. . . . [T]here is no question but that a surface platform is not a good sonar platform, nor, indeed,
is it likely that we will ever succeed in making it anything more than marginal. A submarine, on the
other hand, represents a near-optimum sonar platform.52
For those who accepted this position, the consequence was a diminution in the impor-
tance of surface ship ASW programs and an overall reduction in the size of the de-
stroyer force. In a war there would be some leakage of Soviet submarines through the
barriers, and destroyers would be needed to protect those forces so valuable that even
limited losses needed to be avoided, such as carrier battle groups. But early losses to
merchant shipping would be accepted on the assumption that the submarine threat
would soon become manageable due to steady attrition by the barriers.
By the mid-1960s, a consensus developed which embraced the passive acoustics-based
barrier strategy, while also supporting investment in a two-tiered ASW escort force,
with small numbers of multipurpose destroyers assigned to battle groups and other
high-value units, and larger numbers of single-purpose destroyer escorts devoted
largely to ASW for use in screening mid-ocean convoys. One cause of this consensus
being reached was the establishment of Op-95 in 1964 as both the CNO’s and the Sec-
retary of the Navy’s chief adviser for ASW. The first occupant of this office was Vice
Admiral Charles Martell.
This office was formed in the midst of a Navy-wide review of ASW programs and of
future Soviet submarine developments. At the most general level, this review led to
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some relaxation in the near term concern over the Soviet submarine threat but contin-
ued anxiety about the more distant future. The following exchange in a 1964 congres-
sional hearing on Navy research and development is illustrative. The main participants
in the exchange are Congressman Robert Sikes and Rear Admiral E.B. Hooper, Director
of ASW Research and Development.
Mr. Sikes. Do you think that defenses against submarines will ever catch up with submarine offensive
capability?
Admiral Hooper. The question as to whether or not a submarine or antisubmarine force is ahead is a
rather difficult one to evaluate. It is not a symmetrical situation. We certainly have a very good capa-
bility to counter submarines at the present time but it is a touch and go situation.
Mr. Sikes. Surely you would not indicate that submarine defenses can effectively cope with the offen-
sive capability of submarines?
Admiral Hooper. Yes I would in a certain context. I believe right now we have good antisubmarine
warfare.
Mr. Sikes. If that were true, our Polaris submarine would be jeopardized.
Admiral Hooper. That is why I say this is not a symmetrical situation. The capabilities we have devel-
oped help make this give us [sic] these capabilities. Geography is greatly in our favor.
(Discussion off the record)
Admiral Hooper. When one projects this very serious competition well into the future and sees the
number of nuclear submarines the Soviet Union will probably build, one notes the improvements that
he can make, although some of these improvements are going to cost him a lot of resources he has to
pull away from something else. Then the situation is a very serious one. . . .
Mr. Sikes. Let me rephrase my question. If the Soviet defensive or offensive capability were as great as
ours, would your ASW capability be sufficient to cope with it?
Admiral Hooper. I would prefer to say we are able to stay ahead of the submarine menace. I person-
ally believe that if we can make the fullest use of the information we are gaining of the environment, if
we pursue an aggressive and imaginative program with enough emphasis on the basic things, I per-
sonally believe that we can and will stay ahead.53
The motivation behind the aggressive program Admiral Hooper referred to in this ex-
tended colloquy seems to have been based on a tendency to base future ASW require-
ments on what would be needed to counter submarines of the quality the United States
was currently building deployed in the numbers that the Soviets were capable of pro-
ducing in the future.
Already, it was becoming clear that this approach could lead to great success when
Soviet efforts did not live up to this expectation. For example, Secretary of the Navy
Paul Nitze testified in 1965 that “our antisubmarine warfare effort of past years has
been more effective than we have sometimes realized. We have had the advantage of
training against our own submarine forces, which, as you know, have been in the fore-
front of both development and operational know-how since World War II. Thus, our own
peacetime opposition has perhaps been more effective than a real enemy would be.”54
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The same dynamic at a more technical level was described by Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research and Development Robert Morse in an effort to explain the source of
the tremendous acoustic advantage American submarines enjoyed in 1965 over their
Soviet counterparts. He noted that:
It came about, I think, by just a general overall attention to sound reduction, in every possible way,
looking at every piece of machinery, how it was mounted, looking at the connections to the outside,
that is of cooling pumps and so on which can then pump noise out along with the water, looking at
the sources or the ways in which sound is generated and is transmitted from the submarine. . . . One
of the reasons that we have been benefited so much is that we had made great progress in antisubma-
rine warfare. I think that without the ability to make good measurements on our own submarines and
without having the stimulation to do it by knowing that that was an Achilles’ heel to the submarine,
that we would not have made that progress. That is, the quieting of your own submarines comes in
many ways from a consciousness of the antisubmarine problem.55
But would not the Soviets take the same steps sometime in the future, Morse was asked?
Oh, yes; yes sir. There are no secrets or no real magic in the technology that we have used. The transla-
tion of this into engineering practice, though, is not necessarily easy. That is, one has to go through
many evolutionary steps. We have gone through them and if you looked at our own quieting pro-
gram, I think you will see that it rarely took big jumps. That is, it tended to be an evolutionary thing.
That isn’t to say theirs won’t be.56
Thus, if the United States continued to solve the ASW problem against its own subma-
rines and continued to push the development of its submarines past those “solutions,”
it would always stay just ahead of the Soviets, whose submarines would always lag in
capability because their development was not informed by the same consciousness of
the ASW problem but rather was driven only by a focus on the prosubmarine problem.
But if the United States relaxed in its efforts to solve the ASW problem against its own
submarines, the Soviets would quickly catch up because the American lead in quieting
and other prosubmarine technologies was evanescent, in that it was based mostly on
dogged attention to engineering detail rather than any fundamental technical
breakthrough.
This approach to consolidating and preserving the passive acoustics-based approach to
ASW was relatively successful for almost twenty years, from 1960 to 1980. During this
period, mostly evolutionary improvements in passive acoustic capabilities were pur-
sued, and until near the end of this period these efforts remained confined largely to
the SOSUS, SSN, and VP communities. Their success was based at least partly on the
fact that the Soviets did not focus on quieting as much as planners had expected they
would in the early 1960s. Thus the second generation Charlie/Victor/Yankee (CVY)
classes, which began deploying in 1968, remained quite vulnerable to a passive acoustic
approach. In fact, by some measures, the American acoustic advantage against the
CVYs had actually deepened by the early 1970s.
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More turmoil attended the evolution of the carrier-based air and surface ASW commu-
nities during this period. By the late 1960s, the HUKs had lost their open ocean search
role to the VP community, and were focused on screening for carrier battle groups. By
the early 1970s, the expense of providing dedicated CVS groups for this purpose led to
the multimission CV concept, which eliminated the CVS, and assigned half of its VS
and HS aircraft to the attack carrier wing. The surface community focused during the
1960s on making the SQS-26 work. When by the end of the decade it finally had a true
bottom-bounce and convergence zone sonar, it finally abandoned DASH and embraced
the manned helicopter as the main destroyer-based ASW weapon.
The main challenges to the U.S. Navy’s ASW posture during this third and longest
phase of the Third Battle turned out not to be the one that was most feared—the truly
quiet nuclear submarine. Instead, the Navy was surprised to varying degrees during
this period by fast, deep-diving submarines (Alfa and Papa); submerged launch,
antiship missile submarines (Charlie I and II SSGNs); and the long-range, ballistic mis-
sile submarines (Delta SSBNs). In each of these three cases, a major element of the pas-
sive acoustic barrier strategy was threatened, and therefore a major response was
perceived to be necessary, even though in the first two cases, the threat that was initially
imagined never fully materialized, or came much later than anticipated. The fast,
deep-diving submarine threat provoked a major ASW torpedo improvement program.
The Charlie SSGN, with its submerged launch SS-N-7s and 9s, was one of several cata-
lysts leading the surface force to embrace ship quieting and passive acoustics. And the
Delta SSBN with its circa 4,000-mile range SS-N-8s caused a fundamental shift in the
U.S. Navy’s approach to strategic ASW, one that involved a major expansion in the role
of its SSN force.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. First is a discussion of developments
in passive acoustics in the SOSUS, SSN, and VP communities. Second is a discussion of
developments in the ship-based air and surface ASW communities. Third is a discus-
sion of the three Soviet challenges to the passive acoustic barrier strategy and the U.S.
Navy’s responses. The last section will be brought through to the late 1970s, when the
very quiet Soviet nuclear submarine threat did finally begin to appear.
Protecting the Passive Acoustic Advantage
Having embraced the passive acoustic approach to ASW, the SOSUS, submarine, and
VP communities set about improving it in anticipation of much quieter Soviet subma-
rines. A simple way of describing this evolution is to think in terms of array gain and
processing gain. The ideal detection system combines these two techniques to maxi-
mize the signal-to-noise ratio. From the beginning, the SOSUS system employed both
techniques. Its seabed arrays were not limited in aperture and could achieve the
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maximum array gain possible for even the lowest frequencies. Likewise, its shore-based
processing facilities had access to computational capacity unlimited by volume con-
straints, and were able to perform the computationally-intensive fourier transforms
needed for spectral analysis at a time when computers were quite large and user
unfriendly.
Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, upgrades to the SOSUS system focused on
evolutionary improvements in array gain, processing gain, and timeliness. The original
arrays had 40 elements spaced equally along 1,000 feet of cable (1x40). No more than
40 elements could be supported by a single cable, and it turned out that acceptable per-
formance could be achieved under many circumstances using fewer elements. To ex-
tract more value from each cable, 2x20 and 3x16 arrays were deployed in which the
elements on one cable were divided into two or three separate arrays looking in differ-
ent directions. This allowed one cable to focus along two or three separate acoustic
paths where surveys had demonstrated optimal deep sound channel propagation.
These arrays also reduced the bearing ambiguity that could exist when using only a sin-
gle array. During the same period, improvements in computer processing allowed for
more processing gain by integrating over smaller and smaller frequency bins.57
As the geographic reach of SOSUS expanded into forward areas, there were also de-
bates about its purpose. Originally conceived as an intelligence asset, SOSUS first
gained support as a means of warning national political authorities of the approach of
Soviet submarines. This was important information in its own right, as Soviet subma-
rines were themselves considered nuclear delivery vehicles. But it was important as well
on a larger level, as such a submarine deployment was also considered a reliable source
of warning of a larger, general attack. For these reasons, like all other intelligence assets,
SOSUS information was always closely held by the intelligence community, and there
was considerable reluctance to release it to tactical ASW forces.
This instinct to protect intelligence sources and methods clashed with the need for
large area undersea surveillance for ASW. The barrier strategy was premised on the
availability of SOSUS cueing for SSNs and VP, and these techniques needed to be prac-
ticed in peacetime, but unrestricted use of SOSUS in peacetime would in all likelihood
reveal its capabilities to the Soviets. Thus, for many years, as with Ultra during World
War II, the exploitation of SOSUS data was done in such a way as to mask the exact lo-
cation of its arrays and their capabilities. For example, tactical forces used only passive
techniques when they prosecuted SOSUS contacts of Soviet submarines, and many
training exercises were conducted against either friendly or neutral targets. One com-
mon SOSUS/VP exercise was to train against diesel trawlers, which had signatures sim-
ilar to a snorkeling submarine.
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From the beginning, the technical community that supported SOSUS understood that
it could be rendered largely ineffective by quieting. In fact, SOSUS played a major role
in the accelerated quieting program adopted by the American submarine force. This
contribution had both an engineering and an operational aspect to it.
From an engineering perspective, American submarine designers sought to build sub-
marines that could not be detected by SOSUS. This resulted in a technical competition
between listeners and hiders in which both sides benefited. The submarine quieting
program was centered at the David Taylor Model Ship basin (now known as the Naval
Surface Warfare Center, at Carderock, Maryland), while the research and technical sup-
port for SOSUS was done at Bell Labs, Columbia’s Hudson Lab, Scripps, and Woods
Hole. One example of this interaction was the discovery of mechanical, blade rate
tonals on Thresher during her early trials.58 The benefits of this internal competition
extended to the operational realm as well. SOSUS often detected unwanted spikes in
the signatures of American submarines, due in some cases to wear and tear in a partic-
ular piece of machinery.
But these experiences also made the U.S. Navy sensitive to SOSUS’ vulnerability to
Soviet quieting. One consequence was an attempt from almost the very beginning to
incorporate active echo-ranging into ocean-wide undersea surveillance. Project Arte-
mis of the early and mid-1960s was such an attempt. As with all attempts to develop
low-frequency, active sonar, the main obstacles encountered in Artemis were in design-
ing a powerful enough transducer and in countering reverberation, the phenomenon
of receiving multiple echoes, both from the initial signal returning over multiple paths,
and from spurious echoes caused by other objects and variations in the sea bottom.
The submarine community emphasized improvements in quieting, both array and
processing gain, better sonar system integration, and formal tactical and operational
analysis. Beginning with the Thresher/Permits, American SSN design demonstrated a
continuing willingness to emphasize quieting over other valuable operational capabili-
ties such as speed and diving performance. Therefore, in the progression from Skipjack
to Thresher to the Sturgeon class in 1967, one sees significant improvements in quieting
with each generation, and a loss in several knots of top speed. Fourteen Permits (plus
Tullibee) were built between 1961 and 1967 and thirty-seven Sturgeons between 1967
and 1975. In the latter period, USS Narwhal and USS Lipscomb were also built as exper-
imental platforms for, respectively, natural circulation reactors and electric drive.
USS Sturgeon (SSN 637) was originally conceived as a modest upgrade to the Permits.
She was larger, both because quieting and size tend to accompany each other, and be-
cause she was given more space to accommodate a more advanced acoustic and
SIGINT sensor suite. With the 637s, the submarine force began to embrace LOFAR
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signal processing as a tool for both detection and classification. Experimental spectrum
analyzers like the BQQ-3 were replaced in the early 1970s by digital systems and were
deployed on all submarines rather than only those engaged in special missions.59 The
637s were also the vehicle for early experiments with towed arrays. Towed arrays were
line arrays of omnidirectional hydrophones much like SOSUS arrays that used elec-
tronic beamformers to achieve array gain. Long, towed arrays could provide more ap-
erture than could bow or hull-mounted arrays, and also suffered less from self noise
and flow noise.
The first towed array used by the submarine force was the Submarine Tactical Array
Sonar System (STASS), which was used experimentally in the mid-1960s and began de-
ployment on a regular basis in the late 1960s. STASS could not be reeled in and out of
the submarine, so it was employed as a clip-on array, meaning that the array was at-
tached to the submarine at the beginning of a deployment and towed for the duration
of that deployment. Later, so-called “thin line” arrays were developed which could be
reeled in and out. The first such was the TB-16, which in turn was followed by the
TB-23 and 29; the increasing numbers representing the increase in acoustic aperture
provided by each succeeding generation.60
One of the first and most important uses for both LOFAR and the towed array in the
submarine force was the creation and maintenance of a library of Soviet submarine
signatures. Each class of submarine, and indeed each submarine, generated its own
unique blend of narrow and broadband sound at varying levels. Knowledge of these
signatures was fundamental to the effective use of LOFAR and to predicting the perfor-
mance of passive sonars.61 Even the most advanced computers of the day were limited
in the number of spectral lines that they could process, meaning that prior knowledge
of the frequency of those lines was necessary in order to maximize LOFAR capabili-
ties.62 Likewise, predicting the performance of passive sonars demanded knowledge of
the strength of the target signal.63 Knowledge of sonar performance was fundamental
to the barrier strategy because expected detection range was the key variable in deter-
mining the number of platforms needed to man a given barrier. Submarines were
uniquely able to collect and maintain this database of opposing submarine signatures,
which served both their own operations as well as the other ASW communities.64
Another unique capability provided for the first time on a large scale by the 637s was
an enhanced ability to covertly track an opponent.65 Prior SSNs could certainly track
their Soviet counterparts, but the tactical challenges involved were high. Tracking oper-
ations demanded the ability to approach the target covertly and establish and maintain
a position to its rear in its so-called “sound baffles.” The situational awareness required
to do this was high, because the distance from which the track was maintained was at
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relatively short, direct path ranges where counter detection was most likely. Alongside
the fact that it was quiet, a 637’s large, spherical, bow sonar array gave its crew a wider
angle view in both azimuth and elevation of its target than did a Skipjack or a Skate.
The analogy in visual terms would be to removing a set of blinders which constrained
one’s field of regard to a narrow cone looking forward.66 The 637s made it feasible to
develop tactics for routine, covert tracking operations that could be implemented on a
force-wide basis.
Many of these operational and analytical activities continued to be centered in Subma-
rine Development Squadron 12 (SubDevRon 12), formerly known as Submarine De-
velopment Group 2 (SubDevGru 2). DevRon 12 was the home of the Tactical Analysis
Group (TAG), which played a major role in the “Big Daddy” exercise series; its subma-
rines were also assigned many forward intelligence missions.
The TAG was set up to develop analytical techniques for examining exercise results and
to use them to predict operational performance. Big Daddy was an annual SSN versus
SSN ASW exercise which the submarine force used in part to develop and validate the
models developed by the TAG. These models could then be used in war planning, in
setting force requirements, and in assisting in the design of new systems. Big Daddy
and TAG were key tools for the Navy to use in convincing both itself and the national
leadership of the viability of its ASW posture. The TAG also developed into a formida-
ble tool for justifying new submarine development to the civilian leadership, particu-
larly in the years the Office of the Secretary of Defense was infected with enthusiasm
for the quantitative methods first introduced by Robert McNamara in the early 1960s.
In this capacity, the TAG played a major role in the justification for the Sturgeon, the
first SSN class produced in large numbers.
DevRon 12 also played a major role in the introduction of new sensor technology. Part
of its charter was to test new equipment, but because it also had an operational role,
these tests often occurred in real world operations. Once the value of an experimental
system was established in this way, it tended to be retained for further use in the
DevRon, rather than returned to its manufacturer for further development. This
low-level melding of the technical and operational communities provided an informal
path for new technology like LOFAR and the towed array to be inserted into the sub-
marine force.
The last major submarine community activity was the development of a new, heavy-
weight ASW torpedo designed for use against nuclear submarines—the Mk. 48. This
story merges with the story of the Navy’s response to the Alfa/Papa threat, which will
be discussed below.
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The VP community focused on solving the localization problem created by initial,
long-range, LOFAR detections by Jezebel omnidirectional buoys and on deploying and
modernizing Lockheed’s P-3 Orion. The key to solving the localization problem was
DIFAR, a directional LOFAR buoy. DIFAR was not a new concept, but its development
had been postponed in the years after Jezebel’s introduction on the assumption that
CODAR and Julie would suffice. The latter two had the advantage of using existing,
omnidirectional, broadband buoys, whereas DIFAR required a new, more advanced
buoy. One of the first steps taken by Admiral Martell when he became OP-95 was to di-
rect that DIFAR buoys be developed on a priority basis.67
DIFAR replaced CODAR as the means of localizing a Jezebel contact. Unlike CODAR,
which used broadband processing, DIFAR used narrowband processing and could eas-
ily match the detection of omnidirectional Jezebel buoys. A plant of several DIFAR
buoys with a long enough baseline provided several bearings to the target that could be
used to triangulate the range. Flying that distance down the target bearing would usu-
ally bring the P-3 within range to achieve a fire control solution.
The deployment of the P-3, beginning in the early 1960s, gave the VP community a
faster aircraft than the P-2 it replaced and one that was capable of carrying a much
larger suite of equipment and crew. P-3 operating bases were established at locations
that allowed them timely access to SOSUS barriers, and as those barriers expanded
during the 1960s, the SOSUS/VP team developed an ocean-wide reach in the Atlantic
and the Pacific. It was this development that led to the demise of the mid-ocean,
hunter-killer role for CVS task forces, relegating them to the battle group and convoy
escort roles. The P-3C, originally known as the A-New project, was an explicit attempt
to modernize the avionics in the P-3, integrating their various functions and making
them more user friendly through automation. This was considered necessary against
faster nuclear submarines, which imposed a much faster decision cycle on system oper-
ators, who on the P-3A performed the integration function themselves and had already
reached task saturation when faced with slower diesel-electric boats.
One role for which the SOSUS/VP team developed a unique aptitude was to stay on
top of forward deployed Soviet SSBNs. This contributed to the strategic ASW role that
had played such an important part in the rise of ASW to the status of a national mis-
sion. According to Admiral Hooper, Director of ASW Research and Development, one
of the principles underlying the strategic ASW mission was:
. . . that one would like to destroy these missiles (Soviet SLBMs) or the means of launching them be-
fore they are launched, if possible, and if so launched we would like to destroy the missiles immedi-
ately and then get those which have not been launched. In other words, missile destruction is
considered as associated with the anti-submarine warfare program.68
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In application, this principle argued for a means of holding forward-deployed SSBNs
at risk of prompt destruction, and the SOSUS/VP team was already prepared to adopt
this mission when the first Yankee deployments occurred in the late 1960s.69
The submarine community was also prepared for strategic ASW against forward-
deployed Soviet SSBNs because of its capability to track them covertly in their deploy-
ment areas. Because Soviet SSBNs of the Hotel and Yankee classes had to pass through
Allied barriers before getting within range of their targets, American SSNs could be
vectored by SOSUS to intercept them as they passed through those barriers. The SSN
would then maintain continuous contact with its quarry, in some cases for the entire
duration of the SSBN’s forward patrol. Also, a powerful synergy existed between SSN
tracking operations and the SOSUS/VP team. In those cases, when the former lost con-
tact with its target, the latter was often able to quickly reacquire it and hand it back off
to the SSN, which could then resume tracking.70
This was a significant capability because the assumption on both sides appears to have
been that Soviet SSBNs not already forward deployed on the far side of NATO’s ASW
barriers when a war started would never even get into position to deliver their missiles
against the United States, either because they would come under immediate nuclear at-
tack if still in their ports or be destroyed at NATO ASW barriers before they got within
missile range of their targets. This is one reason why the Soviets may have considered
their non-deployed SSBNs as theater nuclear assets for use against European and/or
Asian targets.
Traditional ASW Communities and the Barrier Strategy
As the SOSUS, submarine, and VP communities consolidated the passive acoustic ap-
proach to ASW during the 1960s and early 1970s, the carrier-based air and surface
ASW communities struggled with the technical challenge of making themselves rele-
vant to the problem of ASW against nuclear submarines. This technical challenge was
combined with the political challenge of justifying investments in ASW in communi-
ties where other mission priorities were higher. As noted, this period saw the demise
first of the open-ocean, hunter-killer role for combined, CVS-destroyer ASW groups
and then the elimination of those groups altogether and the adoption of the all-
purpose CV air wing. It also saw great turmoil in destroyer ASW programs, including
technical problems with active sonar and long-range ASW weapons, and doctrinal de-
bates over the future role of the surface combatant force.
The HUK mission for CVS groups died because the land-based P-3 could do it more
cheaply once SOSUS arrays and VP bases were forward deployed. VS and VP aircraft
used essentially the same sonobuoy systems to detect and localize nuclear submarines,
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and by the mid to late 1960s, a land-based P-3 could go almost anywhere a sea-based
S-2 could. CVS groups certainly had the ability to more densely cover a given area with
air ASW assets than did more distant VP bases, and their destroyers provided an active
sonar platform with more endurance than a P-3, but these capabilities were more rele-
vant to the radar flooding and hold-down tactics used against diesel-electric boats, and
ASW against diesel boats was increasingly becoming the responsibility of Allied navies.
The CVS groups also died because after Vietnam the cost of maintaining separate CVA
and CVS groups was deemed unaffordable given that the latter now existed primarily
to screen the former. This resulted in the multipurpose CV concept which saw half of a
CVS wing—one VS and one HS squadron—added to each existing attack carrier wing,
replacing a dozen fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft, and requiring ship alter-
ations by installation of ASW facilities and equipment.
Amidst these major doctrinal changes, technical developments in the VS and HS com-
munities continued. The highlights here were the transition from the S-2 to the S-3,
and the development of the SH-3. The S-3 was an ambitious attempt to integrate a
new, carrier-compatible, jet platform with an avionics suite that included a very power-
ful new periscope detection radar, onboard acoustic sonobuoy processing, MAD, ESM,
and homing torpedoes. First deployed in 1974, the S-3A’s autonomous onboard
sonobuoy processing capability was one of its key attributes, giving it the ability to op-
erate beyond the range of line-of-sight data links back to the carrier. But this highly au-
tomated and sophisticated avionics suite shared the major reliability problems that
other contemporary systems had in the period during the early 1970s when advanced
digital electronic systems were first introduced into the U.S. military. As a result of
these problems, the VS community was hampered in its operations until the develop-
ment in the 1980s of the S-3B.
Fewer problems attended the evolution of carrier-based, helicopter ASW platforms. In-
terestingly, this was one of the first areas where the ASW communities using the radar
and active sonar ASW methods, which won the Second Battle, were responsible for a
major technical innovation in Cold War ASW—the introduction of the ASW helicop-
ter with an active, dipping sonar. Beginning in the 1950s, the carrier-based air ASW
community was one of the driving forces behind helicopter development, and within
the HUK groups, HS squadrons deploying active, dipping sonars became a key addi-
tion to the combined arms ASW team.
HS squadrons gave the HUK group an active sonar platform with the speed and mobil-
ity of an aircraft. The original attraction of helicopters with an airborne dipping sonar
was to cooperate with radar-equipped aircraft in operations against snorkelers. The lat-
ter would often detect a snorkel, but the submarine would submerge and be lost when
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it went on battery because no destroyers were within range to hold the contact with ac-
tive sonar. The ASW helicopter, with a dipping sonar, filled this gap by holding contacts
until destroyers, with the endurance to hold the submarine down until its batteries
were exhausted, arrived. As ASW against nuclear submarines became more important,
HS squadrons also were useful because they could operate in noisy environments
where passive acoustics were much less effective, but where screening forces were still
necessary, as in the inner screen of a carrier battle group or within a convoy.
The culmination of this first phase of the helicopter’s use as an ASW platform was the
SH-3 Sea King. The Sea King was too big to be deployed on all but the largest surface
combatants of its time, which limited the ASW helicopter to being a carrier-based plat-
form. This would change in the early 1970s with the development of LAMPS (Light
Airborne Multipurpose System) ASW helicopters, which leads into a discussion of the
surface ASW community.
The key technical issue that dominated surface ASW during the 1960s was to get the
SQS-26 to achieve its full potential as a bottom bounce and convergence zone active
sonar. As long as the surface community was limited to direct path, above-the-layer
submarine detections with its active sonar, it was going to have limited utility as an
ASW platform against any modern submarine, whether conventional or nuclear. With
a fully capable SQS-26, it would become a more formidable anti-diesel ASW asset, but
against a nuclear submarine it would still suffer from the lack of a weapon to match the
range of its main sensor.
By the close of the 1960s, as the SQS-26 finally emerged from its extended development
phase, the weapon issue became acute. During that decade, long-range, surface ship
ASW armament development had focused on ASROC and DASH. ASROC was fairly
effective out to the 10,000-yard, direct-path ranges achievable by the SQS-4 and
SQS-23, but large range extensions for such a rocket-propelled weapon were difficult to
implement because of the “time late” (i.e., how long after the last contact it was fired)
of the weapon and the speed of the target.
In theory, DASH solved both the range and the time late problems, but in practice
never achieved the operational reliability needed for effective operation. Often de-
scribed as a technical failure, DASH’s problems were almost certainly of a more organi-
zational nature.71
The eventual success of the SQS-26 get-well program led the surface community to fi-
nally abandon DASH in 1968 and embrace a manned helicopter option. This led to the
LAMPS I program, a conversion of a lightweight, commercial utility helicopter, which
first deployed in 1972. LAMPS I was small enough to operate from many DASH ships
and it gave SQS-26 ships a reliable, first convergence zone weapon. In the words of Bob
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Frosch, “(LAMPS) finally gave surface ships a final location and detection system to go
with its convergence zone sonar so that we could finally use SQS-26 and towed arrays
for purposes other than deciding when to pray.”72
The LAMPS/SQS-26 combination was widely deployed in the Garcia, Brooke, and Knox
class destroyer escorts (later redesignated FFs and FFGs), sixty-two of which were de-
ployed between 1960–1967. These were arguably the first truly successful, postwar
ASW ships, and at the same time, certainly the least popular members of the destroyer
community. This inverse relationship between ASW effectiveness and acceptance in the
destroyer community highlights the fundamental doctrinal turmoil that community
was experiencing during this period.
As was true in the particular case of DASH, where inherent technical problems were of-
ten used to explain what were really organizational weaknesses, it was generally be-
lieved during the 1960s and much of the 1970s that surface ships were incapable of
being effective ASW platforms against nuclear submarines. In most cases, it was more
accurate to say that given the multimission demands facing the surface community and
its own doctrinal priorities, ASW was always going to be a lower priority compared to
antisurface (ASUW) and antiair (AAW) warfare. Destroyer officers wanted fast, sea-
worthy ships armed with guns and, later, antiship missiles, able to defeat their like in
direct combat.73 This internal doctrinal proclivity was leavened by the powerful carrier
aviation community’s need for surface-to-air missile-armed, antiair escorts for carrier
battle groups.
Juxtaposed alongside these powerful pressures was the need for large numbers of
ocean-going ASW escorts for battle groups, underway replenishment groups, amphibi-
ous groups, and merchant convoys. Truly multipurpose destroyers combining all three
capabilities were too expensive to build in the numbers necessary for all ASW missions,
and single purpose destroyer escorts like the Knox class were therefore built to provide
the numbers needed for the ASW missions like amphibious group and convoy escort,
where the submarine threat was potentially high, but the air and surface threat was re-
duced or being handled by other platforms.
These ships were heroically unpopular in much of the destroyer community because of
their explicit design emphasis on ASW at the expense of AAW and especially ASUW.74
Given the attitude of the destroyer community toward dedicated ASW escorts, it is not
surprising that ASW advocates within that community had difficulty obtaining the re-
sources needed either to solve existing technical problems in ASW or to fund new,
more innovative approaches.
Another problem was that the ASW R&D and acquisition community was increasingly
dominated by practitioners of the passive acoustic approach, and particularly by the
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submarine community. Members of this community tended to view surface combat-
ants as poor passive sonar platforms, which they were initially. On the other hand,
efforts to make surface combatants better passive sonar platforms could be viewed by
the same community as unnecessary and even competitive with other ASW platforms
like the submarine, and therefore to be opposed. Indeed, this is how some explain the
demise of Project Sea Hawk in the mid 1960s, a program that had been designed to pro-
duce an advanced ASW escort combining quiet gas turbine propulsion with an advanced,
integrated sonar suite that included a new VDS capable of independent operation.75
After Sea Hawk was canceled, development of its key components continued, and in-
deed most elements of Sea Hawk were later included in what became the Spruance,
which began deploying in 1975. The later success of Spruance as a passive acoustic plat-
form, which will be discussed below, demonstrated that it was probably organizational
and funding issues more than technical constraints which prevented the surface force
from expanding its role in ASW sooner. Certainly it was not technical constraints
which prevented the Navy from developing a destroyer that combined a towed array
like STASS, Sea King, and a rafted propulsion plant, whether using the new gas turbines
or not. Such a platform could have provided a passive, two convergence zone, subma-
rine detection and prosecution capability to the surface force, and the technology to do
so had already been demonstrated by the mid-1960s.
Thus, by the mid-1970s, the surface force had finally succeeded in deploying a force ca-
pable of providing a reasonably effective active screen out to one convergence zone
around high value assets, but it had yet to embrace the passive acoustic approach nec-
essary to extend its reach out to two or three convergence zones.
On the other hand, beginning in the early 1970s, the passive acoustic-based, barrier
ASW strategy began to encounter unexpected challenges. The great fear and anticipa-
tion of Soviet development of quiet nuclear submarines remained largely unrealized in
practice. Thus, continuing efforts to counter this expected challenge tended to further
reinforce the American acoustic advantage when they met with a mostly static threat
measured in acoustic terms. This was a reassuring development, but it was accompa-
nied by the three other challenges described earlier that will be referred to below as the
Alfa, Charlie, and Delta threats, after the eponymous Soviet submarine classes. The Alfa
threat was primarily a challenge to American ASW weapons, while the Charlie threat
challenged the surface ASW community, and the Delta threat challenged the SOSUS,
submarine, and VP communities.
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The Alfa Threat
ASW weapon development after World War II largely focused on acoustic homing tor-
pedo development, building on the success achieved by the air-launched Mk. 24 “mine”
and the submarine-launched Mk. 27 anti-escort torpedo in the Second Battle. Quickly,
a distinction developed between light and heavyweight torpedoes:
Although modern lightweight and heavyweight torpedoes had their respective origins in the very simi-
lar Mk. 24 and Mk. 27 torpedoes of World War II, they have become very different not only in size
and weight, but also in their attack paradigm. A heavyweight torpedo is launched thousands of yards
from its target, well beyond the acquisition range of the homing system. . . . A lightweight torpedo is
normally delivered to the near vicinity of its target by the launch platform.76
Lightweight torpedoes became the weapon of choice for the air ASW community, while
heavyweight torpedoes were developed for submarines. Surface ships initially carried
both, but came to rely mostly on “thrown” (ASROC) or air-delivered (DASH, LAMPS)
lightweight torpedoes.
The first postwar lightweight torpedo was the Mk. 43. It was the first active homing
torpedo (Mks. 24 and 27 had been passive), and originally was capable of 15-knot
speed and 650-foot depth when first deployed in 1951. Later versions were able to
reach 20 knots and 1,000 feet. The Mk. 44, which entered production in 1956, was de-
signed to counter Type XXIs with submerged speeds of up to 20 knots. It had a range
of 6,000 yards and a speed of 30 knots. Over 10,000 were produced and some remain in
service with foreign navies.
Even as the Mk. 44 entered production, it was clear that it would be inadequate against
the faster nuclear submarines which were already on the horizon. The basic problem
was that an ASW torpedo needs a 50 percent margin of superiority in speed over its
target in order to assure that the target does not escape once alerted to the attack.
Nuclear submarines were expected to achieve 30-knot speeds at 1,000 foot depths,
creating the need for a 45-knot torpedo. A development program to achieve this for
both light and heavyweight torpedoes was begun in 1956. In the first case, this resulted
in the Mk. 46, which began deploying in 1965.
The same size as a Mk. 43, the Mk. 46 apparently met its performance goals.77 Dropped
from an aircraft, it created against a submerged submarine a no-escape zone shaped
like a cylinder several thousand yards in diameter and roughly 1,500 feet deep. The cue
for dropping the torpedo was usually the aircraft’s magnetic anomaly detection MAD
gear, whose range was often less than the search volume of the torpedo itself. During
the mid and late 1960s, the Mk. 46 was deployed widely in the VP community and on
ASROCs deployed on surface ships.
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Heavyweight torpedo development followed a similar path. The first submarine-
launched ASW torpedo was the Mk. 27–4, a 1948 modification to the World War
II anti-escort weapon. It had a speed of 16 knots and a range of 6,200 yards, and was an
interim weapon designed primarily for attacking snorkelers. The more permanent so-
lution was the Mk. 37, begun at roughly the same time, but with more ambitious re-
quirements. When first deployed in 1957, the Mk. 37 was a 26-knot weapon with a
10,000-yard range. As with the Mk. 27, when launched the Mk. 37 would run out for a
set distance along a fixed bearing and then begin a passive circular search, but terminal
homing was active. The 1960 Mk. 37–1 added wire guidance, which allowed the sub-
marine to control the torpedo during the run out, making it more effective against
faster, more maneuverable targets. The 37–1 was effective against targets with speeds
up to 20 knots and down to depths of 1,000 feet, which was only minimally satisfactory
against first generation Soviet nuclear submarines which could exceed 20 knots.
Therefore, the same 1956 torpedo development program provoked by the nuclear sub-
marine threat that produced the Mk. 46 also included a heavyweight torpedo program.
Formal requirements for this latter program were established in 1960, aiming at a
55-knot speed, 35,000-yard range, and 2,500-foot depth.78 In 1967, it was decided to
make this an antisurface weapon as well, which mandated a larger warhead. In 1971,
production of what had become the Mk. 48 started, and the first torpedoes were deliv-
ered in 1972, some seven years after the lightweight Mk. 46 was delivered.
The extended gestation experienced by the Mk. 48 and, to a lesser extent, the Mk. 46 is
a reflection of two factors. First, these were very advanced weapons designed to very
ambitious requirements. Second, these requirements were clearly designed to drive
conventional torpedo technology as much as they were designed to meet a particular,
near-term Soviet submarine threat. Thus, in both areas, nuclear alternatives existed and
were deployed, using lethal radius to substitute for weapon performance. This second
factor was particularly apparent in the Mk. 48 program, which included the develop-
ment of a massive, instrumented torpedo testing facility and firing range off Andros Is-
land in the Caribbean—and which was not conducted on a crash basis.79
These two factors led to a mixed picture in the years from the mid-1950s through the
end of the 1960s. American ASW torpedo development had certainly kept up with the
Type XXI threat during the early part of this period, but by at least some measures, pri-
marily speed, it appears to have fallen behind the nuclear submarine threat, particu-
larly in the submarine force, where 25-knot Mk. 37s were used through 1972 against a
threat that approached 30 knots. Certainly stealthy tactics designed to minimize warn-
ing of attack could go a long way toward easing these concerns, and given the enor-
mous acoustic advantage that had emerged by the 1960s, it was not hard to design such
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tactics for American SSNs using Mk. 37s. Meanwhile, the disparity in speed between the
Mk. 46 and its prey was less troublesome, which made sense because the Mk. 46 used
active search and was therefore bound to alert its opponent as soon as it hit the water.
This reasonably happy state of affairs was upset in 1970 with the deployment of the
Alfa SSN, whose estimated 45-knot speed and 2,000–2,500 foot operating depth sur-
prised the U.S. Navy. Alfa used a high-power-density, liquid metal reactor plant to in-
crease the power-to-weight and volume ratios of her propulsion plant, while
simultaneously reducing the hull weight needed for extreme operating depths by using
a titanium pressure hull. Alfa had a sister, the Papa SSGN, which appeared to employ
these same submarine design technologies for the antiship mission. These submarines,
assuming they were the lead boats of new submarine classes, threatened American
ASW weapons with obsolescence.
Any assessment of the American response to this Soviet challenge is complicated by the
fact that the fast, deep-diving nuclear submarine threat proved in many ways to be a
false alarm. Certainly Alfa was fast, demonstrating a 41-knot speed, but her titanium
hull had actually been used to decrease displacement rather than increase operating
depth, which was more like 1,100 feet. Finally, Alfa’s liquid metal reactors used molten
lead-bismuth as its primary coolant, which generated formidable maintenance require-
ments, including the need for a continuous stream of superheated steam from shore
when the submarine was in port to keep the metal coolant from “freezing.”80 Thus, Alfa
did not enter serial production until later in the 1970s, and a total of only six were de-
ployed before the program was canceled. Likewise, only one Papa was ever deployed.
Instead, the Soviets focused on building the more traditional CVYs, which were
30-knot submarines, with the exception of Charlie, of which more is offered in the next
section. Nevertheless, Alfa and Papa were viewed as impressive achievements that
might return in more reliable and cost-effective form at a later date, and weapon devel-
opment programs were begun in 1972 in anticipation of that event.
The result of these programs reversed in some ways the experience of the earlier effort
to preempt the Soviet nuclear submarine threat begun in 1956. In the later case, steady
improvements in the Mk. 48 were made, first with the Mk. 48–3 in the late 1970s,
which gave the submarine a track-via-torpedo capability through the guidance wire,
and then with the envelope extension program deployed in the early 1980s with a deeper
operating depth, and finally with a series of ADCAP (Advanced Capability) modifica-
tions beginning in the late 1980s that apparently culminated in a 63-knot torpedo.81
ADCAPs were bought in significant numbers and deployed by the submarine force.
Lightweight torpedo developments designed to counter the Alfa threat appear to have
gone more slowly in that the Mk. 50 replacement to the Mk. 46 did not finally deploy
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until the late 1980s, and was never produced in great numbers. On the other hand,
many interim modifications to the Mk. 46 were implemented, including the 46–5
NEARTIP (Near Term Improvement Program), which deployed in the late 1970s.
Lightweight torpedo development was complicated by multiple concerns beyond speed
and depth performance, including warhead lethality, shallow water performance, and
vulnerability of the active seeker to stealthy anechoic tiles, all of which were also ad-
dressed to varying degrees by NEARTIP and the Mk. 50.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Alfa did more for the U.S. Navy’s ASW pos-
ture than it did for the Soviet Navy’s prosubmarine posture. The Alfas were clearly a
programmatic failure, whether for technical or budgetary reasons, or some combina-
tion thereof. Yet they provoked massive investments in ASW weapons by the U.S. Navy,
and these investments resulted in dramatic improvements in the Mk. 46 and Mk. 48,
improvements which helped ensure their continuing effectiveness against the much
more widely deployed CVYs. In some ways, this experience would be repeated with the
Charlie threat.
The Charlie Threat
The Charlie SSGN was the first Soviet submarine to deploy submerged launch, anti-
ship missiles. Twelve Charlie Is were deployed beginning in 1969, each carrying eight
SS-N-7s of approximately 30-mile range. Six Charlie IIs followed, beginning in 1973,
each with eight SS-N-8s of 60-mile range. The total of eighteen Charlie SSGNs eventu-
ally deployed constituted by far the smallest class of the second generation of Soviet
nuclear submarines which, depending on one’s definition, also included forty-nine
Victor SSNs and seventy-six Yankee/Delta SSBNs.82 In order to understand the effect
the Charlie had on the U.S. Navy, one needs to look at the capabilities of its predecessor
in the HEN class, the Echo.
The Echo SSGN, along with its non-nuclear contemporary, the Juliett SSG, deployed in
its antiship version 400-mile-range SS-N-3 cruise missiles designed originally for the
land attack role. SS-N-3s were like the U.S. Navy’s Regulus in that they demanded that
the submarine platform surface for launch, deploy and activate a tracking radar, and
remain on the surface linked to the high altitude cruise missile in flight via datalink,
providing guidance commands based on the submarine radar’s tracking data. In its
antiship version, the Echo depended on prior cueing by a radar-equipped maritime
patrol aircraft and terminal homing by a radar seeker on the SS-N-3 itself.
Echo antiship SSGNs were primarily anti-carrier weapons, intended originally as a re-
sponse to the threat of nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union by carrier-based aircraft
like the A-3 Skywarrior. As such, their SS-N-3s came in both nuclear and conventional
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versions. Outside of this nuclear, homeland defense mission, the Echo’s concept of op-
eration had many problems. In blue water, anti-carrier operations using conventional
warheads, the Echos were vulnerable to long-range tracking by SOSUS; the maritime
patrol aircraft that cued them were limited in endurance and range and vulnerable to
the carrier’s air defenses; the submarine itself was vulnerable while on the surface oper-
ating its radar; the high altitude, relatively slow SS-N-3 was vulnerable to air defenses
in flight; and its radar seeker was vulnerable to jamming and deception measures.
Thus, in many respects, the Echo was an ASW challenge that could also be countered
using ASUW and AAW methods, which is largely what happened.83
Charlie seemed to eliminate many of these vulnerabilities. Though it still relied on
offboard cueing, it was deployed along with the first Soviet ocean surveillance satellites,
which were designed to replace the vulnerable and range-limited maritime patrol air-
craft force with a space-based system, and whose limitations were not yet fully appar-
ent in the early 1970s.84 The shorter range of the SS-N-7, and later the SS-N-9,
compared to the SS-N-3 reduced the flight time of the missile and eliminated the need
for mid-course guidance, thereby eliminating the need for a radar on the launcher and
in turn allowing a submerged fire-and-forget launch. Finally, the missiles were faster
and flew at low altitude, complicating the air defense problem.
Of course, Charlie was still vulnerable to passive acoustic barriers; but unlike Echo, it
appeared that even in mid-ocean, blue-water operations carrier battle groups would
not be able to defend themselves against Charlies that leaked through the barriers, as
some inevitably would in wartime, or which had predeployed in peacetime. Finally, Char-
lie appeared clearly more effective than Echo in the homeland defense mission in which
it would operate against American carriers deploying forward of the fixed ASW barriers.
Much of this promise was not realized in practice for several reasons. The Soviet
space-based, ocean surveillance system never fully achieved its original promise for rea-
sons that go beyond the scope of this discussion, which kept Soviet antiship SSGNs de-
pendent on maritime patrol aircraft cueing, which remained a major weakness in
blue-water operations. Another option was to create a more autonomous concept of
operations in which SS-N-7s and 9s were cued by the SSGN’s own passive sonar, which
certainly could detect, localize, and classify fast surface ships at 30 or even 60 miles dis-
tance, as indeed Western submarine forces later did with Sub-Harpoon.85 More impor-
tant, the Charlie was apparently the victim of a bottleneck in Soviet reactor production
during the busy years of CVY construction. Unique among Soviet combatant subma-
rines, Charlies had only one reactor driving a single screw; their top speed was limited to
24 knots, which was not sufficient to keep up with a carrier battle group in blue water.
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These weaknesses help explain the limited Charlie production run, but they were not
entirely apparent to the U.S. Navy when the Charlie first appeared. One element of the
Navy’s response to the Charlie threat was the long-postponed embrace by the Ameri-
can surface ASW community of the passive acoustic approach to ASW.
The rationale for this was that submerged-launch, sea-skimming, antiship cruise mis-
siles were much less vulnerable to ASUW or AAW countermeasures by a carrier battle
group, and that the ASW screen therefore needed to be expanded in both scope and ca-
pability. SSGNs would not suffer from limiting lines of approach against fast carrier
battle groups in the same way that torpedo-armed SSNs did, and they could therefore
attack from all azimuths. Furthermore, their weapons would allow them to stand off
beyond the range of a destroyer screen using active sonar and also eliminate the need
for exposing a periscope within the carrier’s screen, as Soviet SSNs were wont to do
during high-speed approach runs despite the threat of detection by airborne radars. In
order to defend itself, the battle group would need to be able to quickly detect and
prosecute submerged targets at greater ranges and over wider azimuths. Because a car-
rier’s sound signature propagates through water to the first and second convergence
zones—hence the ranges of SS-N-7s and SS-N-9s—the only answer was for surface es-
corts to expand the reach of both their sensors and their weapons out to multiple
rather than single convergence zones.
The result was that the surface force slowly evolved from a sensor/weapon suite based
on the SQS-26, ASROC, and LAMPS I to one that included by the late 1980s a passive
towed array and the longer range LAMPS III. The LAMPS/towed array combination
revolutionized surface ship ASW capabilities by combining the detection ranges here-
tofore only achieved at the tactical level by submarines deploying large, below layer,
passive arrays with the rapid, long-range prosecution capabilities provided only by air
ASW assets.
Waypoints in this transformation included: first experiments and initial deployments
with a towed array surveillance system (TASS) surveillance array (SQR-14/15) towed
from the variable depth sonar (VDS) fish on USS Patterson (DE-1061) in the early
1970s; the deployment of four TASS-equipped Knox class frigates in 1973, primarily to
the Mediterranean for acoustic surveillance because of that sea’s lack of a deep sound
channel for use by SOSUS; first experiments and deployments with an interim tactical
towed array sonar system (ITASS) array (SQR-18) on USS Joseph Hewes (FF 1078) in
1978; and first experiments and deployments of a higher speed tactical array (SQR-19)
on USS Moosbrugger (DD 980) in 1982. By 1987, there were some forty SQR-18s de-
ployed, with SQR-19 about to deploy on Spruances.86 These critical tests repeated the
earlier experience of the submarine force as it progressed through various experiments
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like the SSKs, Albacore, and Tullibee. Another analogy was the assignment of a special
unit to the task of conducting at-sea evaluation of laboratory concepts: SubDevGru 2
in the case of the submarine force, and in 1984 the San Diego-based Destroyer
Squadron 31 for the surface ASW force.87 Unlike the submarine force though, surface
ships remained multimission platforms, and the surface community retained its in-
stinct to focus on ASUW and AAW, never committing as aggressively to exploiting the
ASW potential of its assets as the submarine force had.
For example, funding constraints forced Spruance’s developers to use a “build it and
they will come” strategy, with “it” being the ship and “they” being the bulk of its com-
bat systems. In the ASW mission area, the first Spruances deployed in 1975, with only
SQS-53, a digital, solid state version of the SQS-26, and ASROC. In the early 1980s,
these ships were upgraded with LAMPS I, a digital spectrum analyzer, and torpedo de-
coys, which added a passive, single convergence zone capability. Only in the late 1980s
did the fully integrated SQQ-89 ASW suite arrive, including LAMPS III and the
SQR-19 towed array, which gave a passive, two to three convergence zone capability.88
Certainly other pressures besides the Charlie SSGN threat were responsible for this
evolution. But the SSGN threat did play an important role, and it is hard not to see
analogies in this process to the contemporary story of the rise of the Alfa threat and the
Navy’s response to it. Unlike the Alfas and the lone Papa, Charlies were deployed in
meaningful numbers, but they did not decisively threaten U.S. carrier formations; yet
the U.S. Navy responded to the Charlie threat with, among other measures, a vigorous
program to improve the ASW capabilities of its surface escorts. By the mid 1980s, the
surface community was finally demonstrating in practice the ASW potential which it
had always possessed. On the other hand, unlike in the case of the fast, deep-diving
nuclear submarine threat, the Soviet antiship SSGN threat did eventually materialize,
albeit a decade after it was originally identified with the 1981 deployment of Oscar,
armed with twenty-four autonomous, 300-mile-range, submerged launch SS-N-19s.
The improvements in the intervening period in American surface ASW capabilities
therefore proved fortuitous, although, as with the original Echo SSGN threat, the an-
swer to the Oscar transcended ASW alone and demanded a multifaceted approach that
included counter-surveillance and AAW as well.
The Delta Threat
The third challenge to the Navy’s passive acoustic barrier strategy was the deployment
of long-range Soviet SLBMs on the Delta SSBN, a modification of the Yankee. A total
of forty-two Deltas deployed in four classes, beginning in 1973, with missiles that had
ranges of 3,500 to (in the case of the SS-N-8 Mod 2) nearly 5,000 miles. These ranges
were sufficient to allow SSBN alert patrols in the marginal ice seas of the Soviet Arctic
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littoral, including the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and later, under the permanent ice
of the Arctic Ocean. This had two dramatic effects. First, Soviet SSBNs no longer
needed to pass through SOSUS barriers in order to get within range of their targets.
Second, deployed close to home, they could now be protected in so-called bastions by
the rest of the Soviet Navy.
The one element of the U.S. Navy’s strategic ASW posture, in its original formulation,
that demanded explicit attention was the need to threaten with prompt destruction
forward-deployed SSBNs that menaced the United States with surprise, short-warning
attacks against its nuclear forces and national command authorities. Otherwise, at a
tactical and operational level, strategic ASW was a lesser included case of the overall
ASW posture. This was so because the range of first and second generation Soviet
SLBMs was insufficient to allow attacks against the continental United States without
prior passage by the launch platform through at least one and sometimes several ASW
barriers. These barriers were established to keep all Soviet submarine forces from de-
ploying into mid-ocean areas in a war, and they did not discriminate among platforms.
Thus, assuming that forward deployed SSBNs could be held at risk, the rest of the task
of protecting the United States from Soviet SLBMs was performed by the barriers.
Delta eliminated this natural convergence of ASW tasks, forcing the Navy and higher
political authorities to consider whether a new strategic ASW posture needed to be
fashioned in which explicit steps would be taken to counter Soviet SSBNs able to strike
American targets from the far side of Western ASW barriers. One position in the ensu-
ing debate, first associated with the Nixon doctrine and the tenure of Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations, emphasized the U.S. Navy’s sea control mission
and its role in assuring the reinforcement of conventional forces assigned the defense
of Western Europe. Focusing on sea control would mean the abandonment of any
thoughts of trying to place at risk Delta SSBNs withheld in Soviet littoral waters. As
one naval historian has written, “Zumwalt consciously chose to avoid offensive opera-
tions in strategically sensitive regions where the enemy ballistic missile submarines
were on patrol. On one occasion, the State Department even announced that this was
declared U.S. strategy.”89
An alternative view, and the one eventually adopted, was that an explicit attempt
should be made to go forward and hold Soviet SSBNs at risk. This would be done by
surging American SSNs into Soviet SSBN patrol areas in a crisis or at the outset of a
war. Over the thirty to sixty days that such a war could be surmised to last in its con-
ventional phase, American SSNs would search Soviet submarine operating areas and
attack those Soviet submarines, especially SSBNs, which they might find. The rationale
for this approach was twofold. First, it would steadily change the strategic nuclear
6 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
balance in the United States’ favor over the course of a conventional war in Europe.
This might simultaneously reduce the Soviets’ incentives for continuing to fight con-
ventionally if they had met stalemate, reduce their incentives to escalate in order to
break that stalemate, and increase the credibility of Western escalation in the alterna-
tive case, where the Soviet conventional attack seemed on the brink of success.
Second, and perhaps more important from the Navy’s point of view, a forward strategic
ASW campaign would actually serve American sea control efforts by forcing the Soviet
Navy to divert many of its sea denial assets to the SSBN bastion defense mission. Here,
the approach was an inversion of the normal relationship between the dominant and
weaker naval powers regarding the submarine, with the U.S. Navy exploiting the fact
that its submarines could also divert Soviet naval assets to the ASW mission in dispro-
portionate numbers.
Evidence that such a diversion would be possible already existed by the mid-1970s.
From the beginning, forward deployments of Yankee SSBNs by the Soviets had put
them in the teeth of a formidable array of U.S. Navy and other Western ASW assets.
Aware of this vulnerability, analogous in the words of one U.S. Navy admiral as that
of a “tethered goat,” the Soviet Navy “pulled some of its best torpedo-armed nuclear-
powered submarines out of the Mediterranean and deployed them to the western At-
lantic, perhaps in an effort to provide protection for patrolling missile subs which until
now have operated alone.”90 Both rationales for the forward strategic ASW mission
were described publicly by Admiral James Watkins, the Chief of Naval Operations, in
1986, although most if not all elements of this strategy were in place by the late 1970s.91
Forward strategic ASW could only be performed by SSNs, especially when it involved
under-ice operations.92 Therefore, as the mission grew in importance, this fact was re-
flected in both force structure and platform design decisions, including a steady rise in
SSN force levels, culminating in the hundred-SSN-force requirement of the 600-ship
navy and the design of USS Seawolf. The cost of growing SSN force levels and the focus
on far forward operations contributed to a relative decline in the share of investments
in other ASW communities.93 It also led to Seawolf, whose emphasis on fast tactical
search speeds and a massive torpedo magazine were reflections of its design mission,
which was to independently search for and kill Soviet submarines in the relatively con-
fined and target rich northern waters of the Soviet Arctic littoral.
There are several differences in the story of the U.S. Navy’s response to the Delta threat
compared to the Alfa and Charlie threats. First, the Soviet long-range SSBN threat ac-
tually developed as expected. It did not turn out to be an experiment that failed or was
dramatically delayed in its execution, but instead was implemented rapidly and on a
large scale. Second, there was some degree of open political controversy over whether a
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response to this Soviet challenge was even needed, whereas in the previous cases any
controversy that occurred was largely internal to the Navy and the Department of De-
fense, focused on finding the best technical and operational means of responding to a
challenge that all agreed had to be met. Third, it is also more difficult to assess how ef-
fective the Navy’s response was to the Delta challenge.
It is difficult to determine whether the Navy’s SSN-based, forward strategic ASW pos-
ture would have been effective at the tactical and operational levels or whether it would
have had its anticipated political effects. The uncertainties here are basic, given both
the large scale of the anticipated strategic ASW campaign and the lack of documenta-
tion for the sources of Soviet behavior.
Unclassified tactical and operational assessments of the Navy’s forward strategic ASW
campaign were and remain almost universally pessimistic concerning the Navy’s capa-
bilities in this mission.94 The main reasons given for this skepticism are the dual effects
of shallow water and quieter submarines on acoustic search rates. Shallow water elimi-
nates the deep sound channel and convergence zone propagation paths that minimize
sound absorption over long distances; it limits detection ranges to the direct path, and
quiet submarines amplify this effect by reducing the source level of the original signal.
Forward strategic ASW would therefore be conducted in an environment that reduced
the effect of the acoustic advantage that American SSNs had traditionally enjoyed ver-
sus Soviet submarines, and more important, quiet Soviet SSBNs would begin to elimi-
nate that acoustic advantage.
The assumption in these analyses that Soviet SSBNs were becoming quieter and would
achieve further reductions in source levels in the future reflected the fact that a serious
and unambiguous Soviet submarine quieting effort had finally become manifest by the
early 1980s. Such an effort had been anticipated for twenty years.95 Even as late as 1976,
the Navy was still being surprised at how loud successive generations of Soviet subma-
rines remained. For example:
Those of us who are in the technical community had staked our reputations on the fact that when
the Delta-class submarine(s) went to sea in 1976 they were going to demonstrate a fundamental qui-
eting program, and we said that to the rest of the world and they did not do it and we lost a lot of
credibility.96
This turned out to be the last of many such pleasant surprises, because soon after
Delta’s deployment came the Victor III in the late 1970s. Regarding the Victor III, Ad-
miral Watkins testified that “we had misjudged the absolute sound and pressure levels
of the Soviet Victor III. We had made an estimating error and found that they were
quieter than we thought. . . . We learned that they are very hard to find.”97 The Victor
III was the first Soviet submarine that surprised the Navy with its acoustic stealth, and
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its deployment was a harbinger of worse to come. Thus ended the Navy’s two-decade
long “happy time,” and began the fourth and final phase of the Third Battle—the
struggle against the very quiet nuclear submarine.
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Phase IV of the Third Battle
ASW and Acoustic Parity, 1980–1990
The Victor III was a harbinger of the Akula, the first Soviet submarine that approached
or achieved acoustic parity with its American contemporaries. Though first deployed
in 1978, it was in 1981 that the full significance of the Victor III’s quieting sank in.98
From public testimony, it is possible to describe broadly the quieting steps finally taken
in this class. In a 1984 reference to operations against Victor IIIs, Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Watkins testified:
What we also learned was that where we had the towed array that covers the low frequency band it
was effective every time. The lesson is . . . we need to get the low frequency end developed and acceler-
ate its introduction into the fleet. Now we are working on that. We have put extra dollars into the low
frequency end so that we can go after the propeller blade rates and the other things we have to get on a
quiet submarine.99
The significance of this statement is in its reference to the importance of propeller
blade rate tonals for detecting Victor IIIs, which indicates that other, higher fre-
quency, narrowband tonals like those generated by a ship’s service turbo-generators
had been reduced.
This in turn indicates that rafting and other, more advanced quieting techniques first
adopted by Thresher in the United States were probably adopted by the Soviets only
with Victor III. It also demonstrates the significance of the Toshiba nine-axes milling
machinery obtained by the Soviet Union, which gave them the ability to make the kind
of skewback propellers that reduce blade rate tonals.100 This technology, combined on
Akula with the quieting technologies already demonstrated on Victor III, gave the
Soviets by the mid-1980s a nuclear submarine that could elude SOSUS and frustrate ef-
forts by tactical ASW platforms using passive sonar to establish and maintain contact
with it.101 Akula’s narrowband, low-frequency tonals had been reduced below the
source level of its continuous broadband signature, and the source level of that broad-
band signature was close or equal to that of American Sturgeons and early 688s.102 Ab-
sent a strong narrowband tonal structure, and with low broadband source levels,
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passive acoustic detection, classification, and localization of submarines becomes quite
difficult at long range, and counter-detection becomes more likely at shorter ranges.
In time-honored fashion, the threat of the truly quiet Soviet nuclear submarine really
registered in the larger political environment only when it was associated with an ac-
companying nuclear weapon threat. In this case, the combination of these two threats
occurred in the “Analogous Response” deployments of Akulas armed with nuclear
land-attack variants of the SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).103 Like the
U.S. Navy’s TLAM-N version of the Tomahawk SLCM, SS-N-21 could not be detected
reliably by existing early warning systems, which raised the specter of “no warning”
nuclear attacks against important time-urgent targets like national command centers
and bomber bases.104 At the same time, American ASW forces found it quite difficult to
detect and maintain continuous contact on forward deployed Akulas in the way that
they had with prior generations of louder submarines.105 This resulted in several inci-
dents in which, as one participant put it, “the entire Navy had to deploy in order to
find and maintain contact on one submarine.”106
Two responses to the quiet submarine threat emerged during the 1980s. Both were
driven by the fear that very long-range, passive acoustic detection of Soviet submarines
would soon be a thing of the past. The first response increased the emphasis on the di-
version strategy that had first developed in response to the Delta threat, by increasing
the U.S. Navy’s wartime emphasis on forward SSN operations. The second response
sought to prepare the Navy’s ASW posture for a world in which barriers, open ocean
search, and diversion were all less effective. In this world, the only answer was a return
to the cooperative ASW tactics that had been largely abandoned after the passive
acoustic revolution of the early 1960s.
The Diversion Strategy
The diversion strategy sought to use submarines offensively in forward operations in
such a way as to divert the Soviet Navy, and particularly its best SSNs, away from other,
more offensive missions. It was classically associated in the Navy’s Maritime Strategy of
the 1980s with forward SSN operations in Soviet SSBN bastions, but the decision to de-
ploy TLAM-N on American SSNs may also have been motivated in part by the diver-
sion strategy. In the first and most important case, the argument was that the Soviets
would be forced to protect their SSBNs with their best SSNs.
This strategy relied on the unique diversionary effects of forward SSN operations. It
was based on the view that the Navy could best exploit its dwindling acoustic superior-
ity through offensive operations, but that eventually, when true acoustic parity arrived,
ASW would become essentially impossible. This view was most clearly expressed in
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1986 by Admiral Kinnard McKee, then Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, when he
opined that:
Eventually, U.S. and Soviet submarine capabilities will converge. Then we will have to think about dif-
ferent applications for submarines because ASW is only going to become a defensive business for sub-
marines in my judgment. It will be blind man’s bluff with other submarines. . . . Many of the other
roles for submarines will become more predominant as we go further into the future, because at some
point, nobody will be able to find a submarine with anything.107
In order to avoid acoustic parity for as long as possible, it was important to wring out
the last improvements in passive acoustics and deploy them on a new submarine opti-
mized to exploit them. This would be Seawolf. In order to best exploit the acoustic su-
periority that remained, submarines like Seawolf and improved Los Angeles-class 688s
should be used offensively.
As noted, Seawolf was designed with forward operations in mind.108 Its three key char-
acteristics were a much faster tactical speed than the 688, a much larger weapon load,
and eight rather than four torpedo tubes. Tactical speed is the maximum speed at
which a submarine can operate and still detect and classify an opposing submarine
without being counter-detected. High tactical speeds give high search rates, and high
search rates are necessary for independent, forward ASW operations. A larger weapon
load gave Seawolf more endurance in its operating area by reducing the need to return
to port for replenishment. Finally, eight torpedo tubes gave Seawolf a larger Mk. 48
multishot capability. Forward ASW operations in the relatively narrow seas of the
Soviet Arctic littoral were expected to produce a target rich environment, and in such
an environment, torpedo load-outs rather than crew endurance were likely to be the
limiting factor on patrol length. Also, the distance back to port or to a submarine ten-
der was longer the further forward were American submarine patrol areas, increasing
the base-loss factors involved with multiple sorties.
The benefits in terms of diversion of these forward ASW operations were described by
Admiral McKee as follows:
We build a submarine that can stay ahead of the threat and can operate alone and unsupported wher-
ever it wants to go. It provides the fleet commander significantly improved offensive and defensive le-
verage. . . . It gives him the ability to dictate where the opposition must commit forces to protect
themselves. . . . When they have to deal with submarines they cannot handle, it gives them an in-
creased ASW force level requirement, forces them to commit resources to ASW forces that they would
rather put in other places, and reduces their tactical flexibility because the amount of forces required
to meet a competent submarine threat increases his risk dramatically. . . . Finally, an attack submarine
can modify the entire strategic posture and it has. The Soviet strategic sea-based deployment posture
is based on his concern for the opposition of U.S. submarines. . . . We would like them to continue to
have to deal with that. The bottom line is leverage.109
The resulting leverage imposed on the Soviets was the asymmetric price paid by any
force that must exercise sea control against submarines, diverting the best Soviet SSNs
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away from offensive missions where they could otherwise extract the same price from
U.S. and Allied ASW forces.
One key to the success of this diversion strategy was a certain minimum level of acous-
tic superiority. In the long run, Admiral McKee himself had expressed pessimism about
whether such an advantage could be maintained. In the near term, even with Akula,
forward ASW operations by SSNs might remain effective for several reasons.
First, the levels of quieting achieved by Akula would not be representative of the overall
Soviet force for some time. In the meantime, American SSNs could exploit the fact that
they retained an acoustic advantage over earlier Soviet submarines, including their
SSBNs. That such an advantage still existed is clear from statements that Akula was
both quieter than Delta and louder than the latest 688s, giving the latter a still signifi-
cant acoustic advantage over the bulk of the Soviet SSBN force.110
Second, there is some evidence that the cost of achieving and maintaining acoustic par-
ity for the bulk of its submarine forces might exceed what the Soviets were willing to
pay, both financially and politically. In the latter case, the Soviet Navy had to convince
Soviet shipyards to incur the costs involved with a serious quieting program. The U.S.
Navy discovered those costs in the 1960s, when it was forced to institute a serious qual-
ity control program. One catalyst was the USS Gurnard:
USS Gurnard, the first (Sturgeon) built at Mare Island, was surprisingly noisy. It was determined that
no particular flaw existed in the design. Instead, the ship’s relatively high noise level was traced to a
large number of minor imperfections in equipment supplied by contractors and insufficiently checked
by the yard. Silencing had to be a combination of very careful design and very tough—and
costly—quality control at the subcontractor and shipyard levels.111
The Soviet Navy clearly had more trouble than did the U.S. Navy in winning similar
battles with its own shipyards, which in the Soviet system were part of other independ-
ent and powerful central ministries. Another problem was the historic Soviet emphasis
on land-based nuclear forces, which had a particular impact on investments in Soviet
SSBNs. Whatever the reasons, it remained the case in the 1980s, and still does today,
that Soviet SSBNs are louder than the quietest Soviet SSNs.112
More important in judging the effectiveness of the diversion strategy, there is consider-
able evidence that the Soviets themselves believed it would be effective. Beginning in
the mid 1970s, some American analysts of the Soviet Navy had already begun arguing
that its contemporary naval buildup was largely defensive, and that the Soviet Navy saw
“Sea Control on behalf of missile submarines [as] not a secondary but, along with stra-
tegic strike, a main goal, to be carried out using surface ships, aviation, and general-
purpose submarines as the first and main task from the very beginning of the war.”113
In the face of worldwide Soviet naval power projection exercises like Okean 75, many
in and out of the Navy disputed this argument about Soviet intentions. But it gained
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great credibility by the mid 1980s after Soviet exercises during the intervening period
had clearly demonstrated a focus on pro-SSBN operations.
In contrast to the major 1975 worldwide Soviet naval maneuvers called Okean 75, when Soviet tactics
emphasized projecting power into distant waters and cutting Western sea lanes, more recent maneuvers
have focused on finding and destroying enemy submarines and protecting their own missile subs. . . .114
This radical change in Soviet behavior was a mystery to U.S. naval intelligence analysts
when it first began to occur in the mid and late 1970s, but the mystery was resolved in
1985 when the Navy first broke the Walker espionage ring, whose information had
shown the Soviets how vulnerable their SSBNs were.115
As noted earlier, the Navy’s forward ASW strategy attracted considerable skepticism
when it was declared publicly in 1986. The contrast between this skepticism and actual
Soviet behavior is striking, in that the latter clearly behaved as if the skeptics were
wrong. Classification still prevents a detailed discussion and assessment of forward
SSN operations in Soviet SSBN bastions during the last decade of the Cold War, but
certain observations can be made with confidence based on the discussion to this
point. These suggest possible explanations for Soviet fears regarding American strategic
ASW capabilities.
First, though the relatively shallow Barents Sea foreclosed convergence zone detection
ranges, it had a relatively smooth bottom which produced superb bottom bounce
propagation and a sound-velocity profile almost uniformly favorable to surface
ducting. This provided for fairly long propagation paths for low-frequency signals of-
ten far exceeding normal direct path ranges, even if these paths were still much shorter
than the convergence zone or deep-sound channel propagation paths available in deeper
water. Thus, one finds those who have actually conducted submarine operations in these
waters often speaking of the excellent sonar conditions they experience there.116
Second, given the lingering acoustic advantage that American SSNs retained over
Soviet SSBNs (as opposed to Akula), logic would certainly argue that peacetime track-
ing operations remained viable. Though there was no substitute for the cueing func-
tion provided by the passive acoustic barriers through which older Soviet SSBNs had to
deploy to reach targets in the United States, tracking operations in forward areas might
nevertheless remain viable if SSNs could pick up their prey soon enough after they left
port. In this case, geography provided a focal point that offered the cueing function
formerly delivered by SOSUS. Because 80–90 percent of the total fleet of about sixty-
five Soviet SSBNs continued to remain in port in peacetime, the peacetime require-
ments for forward deployed American SSNs would remain manageable, especially as
their force structure grew toward a goal of one hundred beginning in the early 1980s,
and their forward-deployed operations tempo remained equal to or even a little higher
than, at 20 percent, Soviet SSBNs.
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But third, the assumption that Soviet SSBNs not already forward deployed at the outset
of a war would not survive in significant numbers to deliver their missiles against U.S.
targets would no longer be viable. Commensurate with the Soviet development of lon-
ger range SLBMs and the establishment of their SSBN bastions was a renewed empha-
sis by NATO on raising the nuclear threshold on the central front of Europe. A direct
goal of these efforts was to extend the duration of the conventional phase of a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict from days to weeks or even months. In this scenario,
Soviet SSBNs in port at the outset of a NATO-Pact conflict would not be exposed to
immediate nuclear attack when the war started. Furthermore, if and when they surged
into their operating areas soon after the war started, there would not necessarily be any
NATO ASW barriers to penetrate before they were in range of their targets. The key de-
terminant of American strategic ASW effectiveness would therefore no longer be only
peacetime tracking operations but also wartime operations. These would aim either to
pick off Soviet SSBNs as they surged from port or for those SSBNs that escaped port
safely, to search for, find, and attack those SSBNs in their patrol areas.
The more pessimistic analyses of American strategic ASW capabilities emphasized the
problem of finding a Soviet SSBN force that had successfully surged into its patrol
areas without being tracked or attacked as it exited port. Here, one is looking at a
search problem over an area spanning, at a minimum, the Barents, the Sea of Okhotsk,
and under the permanent ice in the Arctic. The searchers would be American SSNs
which had surged forward after the Soviet deployment. The important independent
variables other than the search area and the number of searchers were the search rate
of individual SSNs and the tactics of their prey, and the important dependent variable
was time. How many Soviet SSBNs could American SSNs kill during the conventional
phase of a war whose length could not be foretold?
The other side of the equation concerned the vulnerability of American SSNs to coun-
terattack. Here it is important to note the tactical constraints associated with a
long-range, wire-guided torpedo like the Mk. 48. When a wire-guided torpedo is
launched, it is under the control of the launching submarine via the wire, which re-
quires that the launching submarine stay slow and remain pointed toward the target.
The torpedo remains wire-guided until it reaches the acquisition range of its own active
sonar. When the weapon operators determine that the torpedo has acquired the target
submarine, they cut the wire and the weapon becomes autonomous, freeing the launch-
ing submarine to maneuver without constraint. Assuming for the sake of argument that
the Mk. 48 had a ten-mile range, a two-mile active acquisition range, and a maximum
speed of 60 knots, certain parameters of the resulting engagement become clear.
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First, an engagement begun at ten nautical miles will take roughly ten minutes to com-
plete, and because a fast torpedo like the Mk. 48 is quite loud, the target submarine will
know that it is under attack essentially as soon as the torpedo is launched. Second, for
the first eight minutes, the control of the torpedo will remain with the launching sub-
marine. A standard Soviet tactic would be for the target submarine to launch an active
homing torpedo down the bearing of the incoming Mk. 48 in the hope that it might
cause the American submarine to cut the Mk. 48 wire and run, or that it might kill the
American submarine if it stayed to complete the engagement, albeit in the latter case,
probably too late to prevent the incoming Mk. 48 from going active and killing the
Soviet submarine first.
The nature of such an engagement provides one explanation of why the Soviets might
have begun escorting their SSBNs with SSNs on a routine basis once they established
their barrier strategy, as they are alleged to have done. In this scenario, an attacking
American submarine might not detect the escort when it attacked, or would be faced
with the need to launch multiple Mk. 48s simultaneously, either case representing less
encouraging odds of survival for the attacking submarine. It also explains the Soviet
interest in rocket-propelled torpedoes, whose speed would allow a counterattack to
strike home before the “go active” range of the Mk. 48 had been reached, assuming of
course that some form of guidance and fuzing could be arranged for a super-cavitating
torpedo. On the American side, this tactical scenario demonstrates the logic behind
Seawolf, especially her eight-tube multishot capability and large magazine, and it also
demonstrates the great tactical value of a quiet torpedo, and indeed the submarine
force was pursuing a quieter Mk. 48 as the Cold War came to an end.117
A more positive assessment of American strategic ASW capabilities would start with
more optimistic assumptions about the respective timing of the surge deployments of
the two forces and whether they occurred prior to or after the start of the war. For ex-
ample, American SSNs might win a race to the Barents and the Sea of Okhotsk such
that numbers of them were in place off Soviet ports before Soviet SSBNs had surged.
This might occur in a case where the Soviets had withheld their SSBNs in port until af-
ter the war started so as not to provide NATO strategic warning of its imminence. Un-
der these circumstances, strategic ASW would be less of a wide area search problem
and more of a barrier problem in a target rich environment, where the two most im-
portant independent variables were the exchange rate in engagements between Soviet
and American submarines, and the latter’s supply of torpedoes.
The important question concerns Soviet perceptions about American strategic ASW ca-
pabilities. There is considerable evidence that American political and military leaders un-
derstood this. In fact, some of them speak in retrospect of the mission of “perception
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management” regarding the Soviet Navy and its political leadership. For example, on at
least three occasions during the 1980s, the entire American attack submarine force was
flushed out of port and sent to sea in a matter of days. These demonstrations of the
U.S. submarine force’s ability to surge forward quickly on a moment’s notice were
designed in part as a perception management device, and one message that was
probably received by the Soviets concerned the possibility that their SSBNs would
lose a race to the Barents with American SSNs.118 This would certainly be one ex-
planation for the disparity between most outside analyses of American strategic
ASW capabilities and Soviet behavior.
Even to its supporters, the seeming success of this strategy at diverting the best Soviet
SSNs to pro-SSBN missions was not a long term source of comfort, because acoustic
parity at very low source levels between all American and Soviet submarines appeared
inevitable in the long term. This led to a resurgence of interest in coordinated ASW
employing multiple sensors and multiple platforms.
The Return of Coordinated ASW
When the passive acoustic barrier strategy was embraced during the 1960s, the need for
coordinated ASW declined, the final death knell sounding with the elimination of the
HUKs after Vietnam. Relatively loud nuclear submarines could be continuously
tracked on an ocean-wide basis, while diesel-electric submarines could be interdicted
at forward barriers, through which they needed to move at reasonable speed in order to
reduce base-loss factors, and where they therefore needed to snorkel to keep their bat-
teries charged, exposing themselves to long-range passive detection.119 Diesels that
leaked through the barriers could be countered by battle groups with speed and an in-
ner ASW screen, but the problem of protecting slower merchant shipping in the open
ocean and in focal areas near allied ports remained. Merchant convoys would be es-
corted by ASW frigates in the open ocean, and these retained the kernel of a coordi-
nated ASW approach in their use of organic helicopters and supporting VP. But this
mission and the more ambitious mission of protecting shipping in focal areas near de-
barkation ports were largely delegated to Allied navies, the clearest example being the
Royal Navy, which retained HUK groups organized around their small deck carriers.
Because it largely delegated this part of the ASW problem to its allies, the U.S. Navy let
its ability to find and maintain contact with truly quiet submarines atrophy.
Thus, when Analogous Response brought this problem back to the fore, the Navy made
an effort to reacquire this expertise. One center of this activity was in Destroyer Squad-
ron 31, which experimented with more coordinated approaches to finding and main-
taining contact with Akulas on Analogous Response patrols in the Pacific.120 These
exercises relied on much greater coordination at both the operational and tactical levels
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between the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System, submarine, VP, and DesRon as-
sets involved.
For example, much more vigorous interaction between the IUSS community and the
operating forces was instituted, both in advance of and during an exercise. In the for-
mer case, operators were given a much fuller picture of what the intelligence commu-
nity knew about its target, including the history of its past deployments, and its
expected movements. During the exercise, more communication occurred between the
shore-based and at-sea assets, allowing, among other innovations, the reverse cueing of
SOSUS by operating forces. This required much greater access to crowded ultra high
frequency satellite communications circuits and highlighted the importance of real
time connectivity in coordinated ASW.
This innovation was enabled by an organizational change in the management of the
IUSS community. Historically, the IUSS community had been managed by the intelli-
gence community and therefore had shared the intelligence community’s bias towards
protecting its sources and methods. This reduced its tactical utility to the operating
forces, and real improvements in that utility only occurred in the 1980s because the op-
erating forces gained greater managerial control over IUSS.121
Another innovation which gained momentum during these exercises was the use of
negative search information to better assign search patterns for scarce, relatively
short-ranged sensors. Using statistical models, the absence of detection by a given sen-
sor or sensors over time could be used to build up a wide area picture of those areas
where the probability was highest that a real target lurked, allowing the concentration
of available sensors there. This method was initially developed in support of the first
battle group deployments to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea in the late 1970s,
where it was the hostility of the acoustic conditions rather than the quietness of the
targets which drove this development.122
Because the Akulas did not produce powerful, continuous, narrowband tonals, tran-
sient tonals often provided the best initial detection opportunities at long range. Prose-
cution of these contacts required quick closure of the datum by air ASW assets, because
only they could reduce the time lag enough to bring broadband sensors within detec-
tion range of the Akula’s continuous sound spectrum. Also, air ASW assets provided
the only means of quickly classifying these contacts, thereby reducing the time wasted
prosecuting false contacts. These tactics were platform intensive, and one result was the
first operational use of two-helicopter LAMPs III detachments on DDs and FFGs. This
allowed the DesRon to maintain contact on an Akula over extended periods. These ex-
ercises also saw the surface ASW community finally in its element, in that it combined
T H E T H I R D B A T T L E 7 7
the endurance and long-range passive acoustic towed arrays of the SSN with the ability
to coordinate with or organically deploy a high-density air ASW capability.
Contemporary with exercises like those conducted by DesRon 31 were other efforts to
repair or replace damaged elements of the Navy’s passive barrier strategy. The technical
side of this effort included systems such as the Fixed Deployable System (FDS), the
Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System (SURTASS), and various efforts to use explo-
sive sound sources with existing passive sensors in a repeat of the earlier Julie system.
SURTASS was conceived as a kind of mobile SOSUS array. It employs a very long,
very wide aperture array towed by a civilian-crewed ship. The ship, designated
T-AGOS, utilizes the high bandwidths available through super high frequency satel-
lite communications to uplink its data back to shore, where increasingly compli-
cated signal processing is conducted with essentially unlimited computing assets.
SURTASS, and particularly its active version know as Low Frequency/Active (LFA),
was an attempt to recover some open ocean search capability and constituted the
renaissance of work begun and then abandoned with Project Artemis. In many
respects, SURTASS was and remains the cutting edge of the traditional long-range,
passive acoustic approach to ASW.123
FDS was an attempt to repair the barrier strategy by using many simple passive sensors
in an upward looking array that used the reliable acoustic path (essentially the direct
path) rather than the deep-sound channel. Each sensor would cover a small cone of the
ocean column, and fiber optic cable provided the bandwidth to network a vast array of
these small sensors and bring their output ashore for processing. But neither the diver-
sion strategy, nor the reembrace of operational and tactical coordination in ASW, nor
the prospect of new sensor and signal processing technologies came close to promising
a return to the happy time of Cold War ASW when the U.S. Navy enjoyed a major pas-
sive acoustic advantage over its opponent. Instead, the Navy again faced a future in
which the balance between pro and antisubmarine efforts would once again shift deci-
sively in favor of the former. It is for this reason that the demise of the Soviet Union
and the end of the Third Battle seems highly reminiscent of the “saved by the bell” end
of the Second Battle of the Atlantic. And these similarities carry forward into the
post-Cold War era, the first decade of which makes clear that a Fourth Battle for con-
trol of the seas against modern, non-nuclear submarines looms.
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The Fourth Battle?
Submarines and ASW After the Cold War
Current trends in America’s external security environment may confront the U.S. Navy
with new ASW challenges not unlike those it avoided when the Soviet Union collapsed,
albeit in a radically changed security environment. This environment may also demand
that the U.S. Navy’s submarine force adopt additional missions beyond its traditional
focus on ASW. In both respects, the future security environment is likely to challenge
the Navy much as did the one it faced at the outset of the Cold War.
Antisubmarine Warfare after the Cold War
Three specific aspects of this future environment create problems for the Navy’s ASW
posture: the capabilities and relatively wide availability of modern non-nuclear subma-
rines; the United States’ extreme aversion to casualties in post-Cold War conflicts over
less than vital interests; and the U.S. Navy’s doctrinal focus on power projection from
the sea at the expense of sea control.124
First, a technical challenge to the Navy’s ASW posture analogous to that resulting from
the first Soviet deployments of the Akula in the mid 1980s may recur in today’s secu-
rity environment with the increasingly wide proliferation of modern non-nuclear sub-
marines.125 Deployed relatively close to their homes, in or near littoral waters through
which the United States may need to project power from the sea, these submarines
pose a potentially formidable threat. With a competent crew and the kind of advanced
weapons that are now widely available in global arms markets, a modern non-nuclear
submarine deployed in its own backyard might become a poor man’s Akula. Of even
more concern is the fact that modern weapons—wake homing torpedoes, for exam-
ple—tend to reduce the demands on submarine crews, making even less competent
crews too dangerous to ignore.
Modern non-nuclear submarines are both better than those deployed by the Soviets
during the Cold War and more widely available as defense industries that served their
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home markets during the Cold War now struggle to use exports to stay alive. One rea-
son that the submarines are better is because many decades of continual investment by
countries like Germany and Sweden have finally paid off in the form of non-nuclear
submarines with air independent propulsion (AIP) systems that make them true sub-
marines rather than mere submersibles. These submarines still do not provide the mo-
bility and endurance of a nuclear submarine, but they greatly reduce the “indiscretion
rate” of a traditional diesel-electric submarine, which must expose a snorkeling mast to
recharge its batteries every few days at a minimum, and much more frequently if forced
to operate at high speed.
Modern submarines are also armed with better weapons and fire control systems. One
particularly alarming development is the marriage made possible by the end of the
Cold War of the air independent, non-nuclear submarine with the submarine-
launched antiship missile. Armed with sophisticated antiship weapons available from
several Western and Russian suppliers, these platforms can launch fire-and-forget mis-
siles from over the radar horizon without the need for the noisy and battery-draining
approach run necessary for a traditional, torpedo-armed, diesel-electric boat. This threat
circumvents the time-honored ASW approach to dealing with very quiet diesel-electrics,
i.e., to flood the ocean surface with radar and use speed to force the submarine to either
run down its battery and expose itself in an attack run or stay quiet and defensive.
The primary ASW challenge has always been wide-area surveillance, and the main
challenge initially posed by the new security environment in this mission area is a wide
area search problem. Sound propagates better in deep water than in shallow water, and
non-nuclear submarines can remain silent for extended periods when allowed to patrol
small areas near their home ports at low speed. Using passive acoustics to search for
such submarines is much more difficult than it was to search for relatively loud Soviet
submarines operating in deep water during the Cold War. On the other hand, active
sonars encounter serious problems with clutter in shallow water, much as early radars
did when forced to look down at targets flying over land. And even in shallow water,
the water column still remains relatively opaque to non-acoustic energy, limiting the
role of RF and laser radars as long-range sensors.
Two new systems stand out as first steps toward gaining a wide area search capability in
the littorals. The first is called the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), and the second
is called Distant Thunder. ADS is a passive ocean bottom array that can be deployed by
a surface ship and whose output is currently collected and processed ashore via
fiber-optic cable. Distant Thunder is primarily a signal processing adjunct to existing
ASW combat systems, combined with legacy, air-droppable, active sound sources and a
relatively simple data link that uses existing UHF radios on participating platforms.
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Unlike the Cold War Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) arrays, which listened for
low-frequency, narrowband tonals propagating outward horizontally along the
deep-sound channel, nodes in an ADS array look upward along what is called the reli-
able acoustic path. ADS is a derivative of the Cold War Fixed Distributed System (FDS)
program, which was an attempt to repair the ASW barrier strategy by using many sim-
ple passive sensors in an upward-looking array that used the reliable acoustic path
rather than the deep-sound channel. Each sensor in the ADS would cover a small cone
of the ocean column.
Distant Thunder adds commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) processing to existing towed
arrays on ships (and potentially, submarines) and air-deployed sonobuoys, and links
the processors together using legacy radios with modems to form a network that can
do bistatic or multistatic processing of the echoes from the air-dropped sound source.
The essence of Distant Thunder is that it uses both spatial and temporal processing to
extract a submarine’s echo from the clutter and reverberation of a specific explosion de-
liberately introduced in the water. Long wavelength towed arrays allow spatial processing
that can eliminate clutter and reverberation entering the array’s sidelobes, and temporal
processing allows reverberating echoes from the same object to be compared over time,
thereby exploiting the fact that a submarine’s echo loses less of its higher frequency spec-
trum in that time than do objects sitting on the bottom or floating on the surface.
One of the original concerns about Distant Thunder was that variations in bottom to-
pography and content would interfere with its temporal processing capability, but
worldwide experiments have demonstrated excellent performance over a wide range of
environments. Like all acoustic sensors, performance will vary in practice, depending
on many circumstances, yet Distant Thunder promises to return a substantial portion
of the detection ranges initially lost when the Navy first shifted its focus to shallow
water ASW. Another benefit of Distant Thunder is that it demonstrates long-range per-
formance under a wide variety of acoustic conditions, including the very common case
in the littoral where sound is refracted away from the surface, a condition which drasti-
cally reduces the performance of a traditional, hull-mounted sonar.
Distant Thunder is also a great example of the incredible power of networked sensors,
and the relative ease of backfitting such a capability onto legacy platforms once the
substantial initial challenge of developing the necessary signal processing algorithms is
completed. Distant Thunder can be backfitted onto any towed-array ship or submarine
and onto LAMPs helos and P-3s. For example, on surface ships with the SQQ-89 ASW
system, the physical footprint of a Distant Thunder backfit consists of one server and
two laptops.
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Specialized periscope or mast detection radars can also play an important role in the
ASW search problem. Even during the Cold War, Soviet nuclear submarines regularly
exposed a periscope when seeking a torpedo fire control solution against the fast ships
of a battle group. And, of course, radar has an important role to play in preventing die-
sel submarines from snorkeling to recharge their batteries. Thus, a combination of
speed and radar deployed to search within the limiting lines of approach created by
that speed have always been an important ASW tactic against all submarines. Likewise,
radar flooding—in which a large area is continuously illuminated with RF energy so as
to set off a submarine’s radar warning alarm whenever it exposes a periscope with a ra-
dar warning receiver on an ECM mast designed to detect and warn of an enemy’s
search radars—is also a traditional tactic against diesel submarines. But specialized
mast detection radars like the APS-137 used on the S-3 and the P-3 experience tremen-
dous false alarm rates caused by both sea state and other floating objects and debris
when their detection threshold is set low to maximize range or sensitivity.
The Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination (ARPDD) program is
developing the capability to process the S-3B’s APS-137 returns in such a way as to al-
low very low detection thresholds (i.e., long range and high sensitivity) and very low
false alarm rates. Very impressive results have already been demonstrated in shipboard
experiments, but unlike Distant Thunder, ARPDD needs further development time to
simplify the massive processing capability it now requires before it can be backfitted
onto legacy P-3 and LAMPs platforms.
Second, consideration must be given to a political challenge associated with conflicts in
which the United States is fighting over less than all-out stakes. In such conflicts, there
will be a very low tolerance for shipping losses, but the presence of even a small oppos-
ing submarine force will make it extremely difficult for the Navy to quickly eliminate
the possibility of such losses.
Regarding casualties, even in a major regional contingency the stakes for the United
States are limited, while those of its opponents are very high indeed. The opponent
may be willing to run great risks and sustain high losses, while the United States will
not. Faced with the possibility or the reality of losses at sea, the Navy will be forced to
stop and eliminate that threat before proceeding, and when that threat is submarine-
based, its elimination will not be immediate and may take weeks.
A good analogy is to the great Scud hunt of Desert Storm. Thousands of sorties were
diverted over several weeks from the air war during Desert Storm to hunt for Scud mis-
siles to little or no effect. From an ASW perspective, this experience is illuminating for
both operational and political reasons.
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Operationally, Scud hunting was like ASW against a quiet target. A large area needed to
be searched for objects that easily blended into the background and only intermittently
exposed themselves. Thus radar was used to flood Scud operating areas, unattended
field sensors were also deployed, and aircraft were used to pounce on potential con-
tacts. This was a protracted, extremely asset-intensive endeavor, characterized by false
alarms, high weapon expenditures, and low success rates. In short, a Scud launcher was
most likely to reveal itself by successfully launching its weapon, just as sinking ships are
often the only reliable indication that there is a submarine in the neighborhood.
The political lessons of the Scud hunt also apply to ASW. Before the war, the Scud had
rightly been dismissed as a serious military threat, but once they began landing in Is-
rael, the political imperative to allocate scarce resources to at least appear to counter
this threat rapidly overwhelmed these narrow military calculations. The same political
pressures would be brought to bear on ASW forces facing active enemy submarines,
but unlike Scud missiles, which remain terror weapons without much military utility,
submarines are a deadly serious military threat as well a political one. Therefore, it will
not do to simply appear to be addressing the ASW problem with a major allocation of
resources. Real results will have to be forthcoming before political and military leaders
will be willing to risk valuable seaborne assets, be they Navy aircraft carriers, amphibi-
ous force ships carrying Marines, or Army sealift ships.
A delay of several weeks during the halting phase of a major regional conflict might
not be a war stopper all by itself, but it is important to understand the consequences
for current time-phased force deployment list timelines, which assume the arrival of
millions of square feet of pre-positioned sealift within the first two weeks of the com-
mencement of hostilities. This would transform a rapid deployment into a slow one,
throw the deployment timelines of all the services askew, and open a window of inde-
terminate size at the outset of a conflict in which the enemy can operate unmolested
except by those opposing forces already in theater, assuming they do not need an open
sea line of communication to sustain themselves.
Third, the Navy confronts a doctrinal challenge as it attempts to increase its ability to
project power from the sea. The Navy faces a new operating environment in which it is
increasingly relevant and therefore in demand. Unlike in the post World War II era when
the Navy was searching for a mission, the Navy has been inundated with new missions in
the post-Cold War era, and these new missions compete with ASW for resources.
This has serious consequences for ASW because, as noted above, ASW is a multi-
platform mission area performed by multi-mission platforms. As the Navy’s strike war-
fare, anti-air warfare, missile defense, and amphibious warfare capabilities have grown
in importance in the nation’s military strategy, the Navy has shifted its focus away from
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an emphasis on blue water sea control toward power projection and land control in the
littorals. Yet these missions must be performed by the same platforms that perform
ASW—the air, surface, and submarine communities, all supported by the ocean sur-
veillance community. It is natural that the Navy’s platform communities should shift
their focus; but in a time of declining resources, this shift inevitably comes at the ex-
pense of other missions performed by those platforms.
This “multi-mission pull” increasingly makes ASW compete with strike warfare and
theater air and missile defense for the same resources and training opportunities. The
other mission areas are winning these battles and pulling the Navy’s major platform com-
munities away from ASW, particularly in the aviation and surface warfare branches.
This shift in orientation is occurring at a time when technology increasingly demands
that ASW be a coordinated, “combined arms” exercise if it is to succeed. All elements of
the Navy’s ASW posture must be maintained to succeed in the fight against quiet sub-
marines, but all three of the Navy’s major platform communities perceive that their
survival in the new security environment depends to some extent on their success in
performing other missions.
New Missions for Submarines after the Cold War
The U.S. Navy’s submarines have not been immune to the pressure to look at new mis-
sions, and this pressure has arguably been greatest in the area of strike warfare. One
manifestation of this pressure is the Trident SSBN to SSGN program, which, when
completed, will dramatically increase the submarine force’s capabilities in this mission
area.126 A Trident SSGN program will also demonstrate a repeat of the submarine
force’s post World War II experience, when radical innovation made it a key player in a
new mission, assuring its continued relevance in a new security environment.
Trident SSGNs are being converted because new precision weapons, new platforms for
launching them, and new concepts for using them are needed to help the U.S. Navy
meet the demands created by new geopolitical and technological trends in America’s
external security environment. Geopolitics and technology are conspiring to pull the
Navy ashore from the sea, without eliminating the traditional and irreducible need for
a navy that is capable of controlling the sea. The tension between “From the Sea” and
controlling the sea is real, but a wholehearted embrace by the Navy of one orientation
to the exclusion of the other is neither desirable nor necessary. New ways of perform-
ing precision strike from the sea, if vigorously exploited, will reduce the need for trade-
offs between sea control and power projection.
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Long-range precision weapons can dramatically reduce the mass that must be pro-
jected from the sea in order to produce a given effect ashore, while at the same time ex-
panding the power that can be projected by a given naval force. They reduce the
requirements for mass by making target destruction possible with one or two precision
weapons rather than ten or a hundred unguided bombs; in addition, by allowing long
standoff ranges from the target, they increase the number of platforms that can serve as
precision weapon launchers. This means that both surface ships and submarines can
join aircraft carriers to form a triad of naval strike warfare assets. It also means that
each weapon launcher, whether it be an aircraft or a ship’s vertical launch system for
missiles, is capable of achieving much greater and more precise effects. Future im-
provements in long-range precision weapons will occur at the steep rate characteristic
of technologies still in their infancy, as compared to the more sedate rate at which
more mature systems improve.
In principle, these new capabilities can be used in one of two ways. At one extreme
would be an effort to maximize the Navy’s overall contribution to the precision strike
from the sea mission area. This is tempting, because it gives each of the Navy’s major
platform communities a role in a mission that is clearly of central national importance
in the new security environment and which, therefore, is easier to fund in a time of de-
clining or steady budgets. At the other extreme, the Navy could aim only to meet the
minimum demands for precision strike from the sea, and exploit new precision weap-
ons to minimize the investment in this mission area rather than maximize capabilities.
The advantage of this approach would be that it would allow the Navy to focus more
on sea control, as well as other missions which only it can perform, leaving greatly in-
creased precision strike largely to the other services.
It is impossible today to predict with certainty where on this continuum the Navy will
be tomorrow, but there are two variables which will largely determine the need. First is
the question of access to overseas bases, and second is the evolution of future threats to
American sea control. Assuming continued access to a robust overseas base structure in
both crisis and war, the other services (notably, the Air Force) will continue to be able
to provide the bulk of the required precision strike assets in a future contingency. If, on
the other hand, that assured access ashore is denied or sharply limited, the Navy will be
forced to fill the void from the sea.127 At the same time, future adversaries may continue
to cede the United States control of the seas, as Iraq did during Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, which in turn would allow the U.S. Navy to continue its current deemphasis on
sea control. Alternatively, these adversaries might discover that the best way to blunt
American power projection capabilities is at sea, and that the highest leverage sea de-
nial capabilities are provided by modern, undersea warfare weapons, as both the
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Iranians and the Chinese may have already decided, as suggested by their recent pur-
chases of Russian Kilo-class submarines.
The most challenging scenario for the Navy is one where U.S. access to overseas bases is
greatly reduced, and where the proliferation of relatively low cost and easy to use access
denial weapons—such as modern diesel-electric submarines, anti-ship and anti-air-
craft missiles, and naval mines—continues to grow. This is a world in which the Navy
will have to provide a larger portion of national power projection capabilities, while
also placing much more emphasis on sea control than it does now. Indeed, it is argu-
able that this is the security environment the United States is already beginning to face
along the great arc of the Indian and Pacific Ocean littorals. In it, the U.S. Navy’s rele-
vance is likely to exceed its currently projected capabilities by a wide margin, and deal-
ing with this “crisis of relevance” will demand innovation, particularly in precision
strike from the sea.128
This has led the Navy to explore how best to improve its submarine force’s capabilities
in precision strike from the sea; deepen its commitment to developing improved preci-
sion weapons for use on all naval platforms—and notably its submarines and surface
combatants; and ensure that all naval platforms enjoy connectivity sufficient to link
into future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance nets. The combination of sub-
marines and long-range precision weapons is particularly relevant to this problem, be-
cause it links a weapons platform whose inherent stealth makes it easy to defend and a
weapon against which defense is extremely difficult. It is this combination of inherent
survivability and lethality which the SSBN force brought to the nuclear deterrence mis-
sion; given the rapidly growing lethality of modern precision weapons, this is what
makes a conventional SSGN force such an important opportunity.
The size of this opportunity can be measured directly in terms of the added strike war-
fare and special operations capabilities it provides, and indirectly in terms of the capa-
bilities it liberates in the other platforms with which it shares missions, since they are
normally multimission platforms as well. In the first case, an SSGN assigned to a battle
group would double or triple its strike assets and give the battle group commander a means
of suppressing opposing air defenses and shore-based sea denial forces from a stealthy,
secure, forward-based platform. Used in this way, an SSGN would increase the effectiveness
of and reduce the danger to other battle group strike assets early in a conflict.
Less obviously, by improving the submarine force’s contribution to precision strike
from the sea, an SSGN would also help create additional ASW, air, and tactical ballistic
missile defense capabilities in the air and surface forces by giving the Navy more flexi-
bility to focus on those mission areas should the need arise. This could be reflected
physically in terms of finite magazine space allocations, by allowing other platforms to
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carry fewer strike weapons, or tactically and operationally, by giving other platforms
more freedom of maneuver in space and time early in a contingency when multi-
mission pull is highest.
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Conclusions
During two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, submarines were the
weapon of choice for naval powers needing to contest the control of seas dominated
by stronger navies. In their peacetime preparations for these conflicts, the stronger
navies tended to underestimate this threat to their sea lines of communication. In both
world wars, submarines therefore tended to win the first battles between pro and
anti-submarine forces. ASW success for the major naval powers depended upon urgent
wartime adaptation at the technical, operational, and tactical levels. Even for those
powers that were relatively quick to adapt, as were the British in World War I and both
the British and the United States in World War II, their eventual ASW success was tem-
pered by the radically asymmetric levels of effort by the contestants in favor of the sub-
marine. The one major naval power that failed to adapt to a wartime submarine
challenge, the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II, lost control of its oceanic sup-
ply lines to American submarines with catastrophic consequences.
The Third Battle, beginning roughly in the middle of the century, had a different pat-
tern. First, the U.S. Navy was much more aggressive in its Cold War efforts to counter
Soviet submarines than any of the major naval powers were before the two world wars.
It developed innovative new ASW techniques based on passive acoustics which reduced
the historic disparity in investment favoring the submarine over ASW forces. This
happy state of affairs lasted until the Soviet Union finally deployed truly quiet nuclear
submarines in the early 1980s, but the Cold War was already on its last legs by then.
Thus, in many respects, the U.S. Navy was the first great power navy to win a peacetime
battle for ASW supremacy with the submarine force of a major competitor.
On the other hand, the post-Cold War security environment presents some of the op-
erational and technical challenges in ASW that the unanticipated end of the Third Bat-
tle allowed the Navy to avoid. This security environment is also placing pressure on the
submarine force to adopt new missions, particularly in the area of precision strike. In
both cases, innovation will be necessary by both the U.S. Navy and its submarine force
if the demands of this new security environment are to be met.
In describing the innovations underlying the U.S. Navy’s Cold War ASW effort, this
paper has also sought to lay the groundwork for further research and writing along
two additional paths. First, as an unclassified discussion, it has by necessity left out
much that is relevant to the Cold War ASW story. That story does need to be fully
developed in all its breadth and detail. For example, non-acoustic means of ocean
surveillance, particularly those based on signals intelligence, undoubtedly played a
major role in the Third Battle, as they did in the Second Battle, but remain classi-
fied because of the continuing relevance of the sources and methods involved. The
same constraints apply to details about tactical, operational, and technical develop-
ments in the undersea surveillance, submarine, surface, and air ASW communities.
The Navy should have a great interest in sponsoring rigorous historical studies of
these areas at whatever classification level is necessary in order to preserve its insti-
tutional memory of events now often residing only in the individual minds of a
shrinking cadre of actual participants.
Second, this paper seeks only to establish the record of innovation in the Cold War
ASW battle and does not attempt to explain its causes. The motivation for this effort
was to develop an important series of case studies of successful, peacetime innovation
by a major military organization. The case studies here described are important for ac-
ademic researchers for two reasons: cases of rapid, peacetime innovation in military
doctrine are rare, and the Navy’s success in the Third Battle was largely untold. This pa-
per, therefore, provides additional case material for research on the sources of peace-
time military innovation.
In addition, the particular case of the U.S. Navy’s submarine force’s role in the
Third Battle, especially in the early years from the late 1940s to 1960, constitutes a
puzzle for existing theories of the sources of peacetime innovation. These theories
explain innovation as the result either of outside intervention by high-level politi-
cal leaders, protracted struggles for control within a service among its branches, or
interservice competition between independent military services in areas of mission
overlap. It is difficult to explain the post World War II evolution of the submarine
force in any of these terms—high-level political leaders seem largely absent from
the story at the outset; the changes appear too quickly and decisively to be the re-
sult of the normal pulling and hauling on a generational timescale between inter-
nal Navy platform communities; and ASW was a mission area that the Navy had
largely to itself, unlike carrier aviation and missiles, which did become major bones
of interservice contention. Identifying the factors which caused both the submarine
9 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
community and the Navy as a whole to so quickly recast their entire mode of ASW
operation in peacetime and in the immediate aftermath of a great victory will help to
develop better theories about the sources of military innovation. Such theories, in
turn, can help U.S. political and military leaders with the practical task of adjusting
to the demands of a radically new, post-Cold War security environment.
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Abbreviations
A AAW antiair warfare
ADCAP advanced capability Mk. 48 torpedo
ADS advanced deployable system
AIP air independent propulsion
ARPDD automatic radar periscope detection and discrimination
ASDIC Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee
ASROC antisubmarine rocket
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AUTEC Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center
B BB bottom bounce
C CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CODAR correlation detection and ranging
CONUS continental United States
COTS commercial off-the-shelf
CV aircraft carrier
CVA attack aircraft carrier
CVE escort aircraft carrier
CVS antisubmarine aircraft carrier
CVY Charlie/Victor/Yankee
CZ convergence zone
D DASH drone anti-submarine helicopter
DD destroyer
DESRON destroyer squadron
DIFAR directional LOFAR
E ECM electronic countermeasures
ESM electronic support measures
F FDS Fixed Distributed System
FF frigate
FFG guided missile frigate
FRAM fleet rehabilitation and modernization
G GIUK Greenland-Iceland-UK
GUPPY greater underwater propulsion power
H HEN Hotel/Echo/November
HF high frequency
HF/DF high frequency direction finding
HS carrier-based, rotary wing ASW aircraft
HUK hunter-killer
I IFF identification friend or foe
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ITASS interim tactical towed array sonar system
IUSS integrated undersea surveillance system
L LAMPS Light Airborne Multipurpose System
LF low frequency
LFA low frequency/active
LOFAR low frequency analysis and ranging
M MAD magnetic anomaly detection
MPA maritime patrol aircraft
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N NavFacs naval facilities
NDRC National Defense Research Council
NEARTIP Near Term Improvement Program
NUWC Naval Undersea Warfare Center
P PDC practice depth charge
R R&D research and development
RCA Radio Corporation of America
RF radio frequency
S SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM submarine launched ballistic missile
SLCM submarine launched cruise missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SOFAR sound fixing and ranging
SOSUS sound surveillance system
SS submarine
SSB ballistic missile submarine
SSBN nuclear ballistic missile submarine
SSG cruise missile submarine
SSGN nuclear cruise missile submarine
SSK hunter-killer submarine
SSN nuclear submarine
SSR radar picket submarine
SSRN nuclear radar picket submarine
STASS submarine tactical array sonar system
SubDevGru Submarine Development Group
SubDevRon Submarine Development Squadron
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SUBROC submarine launched rocket
SURTASS surveillance towed array sonar system
T TAG Tactical Analysis Group
TASS towed array surveillance system
TF task force
TLAM-N tactical land attack missile-nuclear
V VDS variable depth sonar
VP land-based patrol aircraft
VP/SSK patrol aircraft/hunter killer submarine
VS carrier-based, fixed wing, ASW aircraft
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